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7. Conclusions1.  Introduction
Studies of the wage structure are as old as the economics profession.  Adam Smith in chapter
10 of Book I of The Wealth of Nations provided a comprehensive and elegant analysis of the
determinants of differences in wages among individuals and employments.  Smith emphasized that
wage differences were determined by competitive factors (compensating differentials for differences
in costs of training, probability of success, steadiness of work, and other workplace amenities),
differences in individual innate abilities (which he felt were relatively unimportant), and institutional
(non-competitive) factors arising from the “laws of Europe” that regulated wages, restricted labor
mobility, and facilitated the creation of barriers to entry.  Smith noted that shifts in demand across
occupations and space could generate transitory wage differentials, but that highly elastic supply
responses would tend to equalize the advantages and disadvantages of different employments over
the long-run in the absence of regulatory barriers to entry.   The tension found in Smith’s analysis
between the roles of supply and demand factors and those of institutional forces in affecting  wages
remains through today a key theme of research on the wage structure.
Early quantitative work on the wage structure examined differences and changes in wages
by occupation [Douglas (1930), Ober (1948)] and industry [Slichter (1950), Cullen (1956)].  Paul
Douglas (1930), a pioneer in empirical studies of the wage structure, studied the evolution of the
wages of white collar (managers and clerical workers) and blue collar workers in the United States
from 1890 to 1926. Douglas documented a substantial decline in the wage premium to white collar
work over this period (concentrated in World War I) and argued that the rapid expansion of access
to public secondary education had led the growth in the supply of qualified workers to outstrip the
growth in demand.  Slichter (1950) emphasized the persistence of inter-industry wage differentials
and the importance of “company wage policies” as well as skill differences as explanations for the2
observed pattern of differentials.  
The human capital revolution of the 1960s and 1970s and the increased availability of large
micro data sets with information on earnings and individual characteristics shifted the emphasis to
differences in wages by education and age (or potential experience).  Human capital models of life-
cycle earnings arising from educational and on-the-job training investments [Becker (1962, 1993),
Ben-Porath (1967), Mincer (1974)] provide a coherent explanation of  relatively timeless qualitative
features of the wage structure that have been found in almost every country and data set examined
[Willis (1986)]: higher earnings for more-educated workers and upward sloping and concave age-
earnings profiles.  But the quantitative dimensions of the wage structure do differ substantially over
time (as well as across countries and even regions).  Tinbergen (1974, 1975) speculated that the
evolution of technology tends to increase the demand for more-educated labor and characterized the
evolution of the wage structure as “race between technological development and access to
education.”     
Research on changes in the wage structure and earnings inequality for the United States and
other OECD countries has literally exploded over the past decade.  The reasons for this increased
research emphasis on understanding wage structure changes are clear.  The wage structures of some
OECD nations have changed considerably in recent decades and reasonably consistent and
comparable large-scale micro data sets have become increasingly available to carefully study these
issues.  Educational and occupational wage differentials (especially the relative earnings of college
graduates) narrowed substantially in almost all advanced nations during the 1970s.  But since then
divergent patterns in the evolution of the wage structure have developed.  Overall wage inequality
and educational wage differentials have expanded greatly in the United States and the United3
Kingdom since end of the 1970s.  A great effort has been mounted to understand these labor market
changes, in part, because widening wage structure has meant widening family income and
consumption inequality and associated social problems.  More modest increases in overall wage
inequality and skill differentials in the 1980s and 1990s are apparent in most other OECD countries.
This chapter presents a framework for understanding wage structure changes and uses this
framework to assess the determinants of recent changes in the  wage structures of OECD nations.
The enormous range of the existing literature motivates a sharp focus on U.S. wage structure
changes to illustrate the fruitfulness of alternative methodologies.
   The overall wage distribution can be decomposed into differences in wages between groups
(typically defined by skill or demographic categories) and within group wage dispersion (residual
wage inequality).    The basic approach utilized in this chapter links relative wage and employment
changes among different demographic and skill groups to changes in both the market forces of
supply and demand and to labor market institutions (e.g., unions and government mandated
minimum wages).  Movements in within-group inequality may also reflect market forces changing
the returns to (unmeasured) skills or directly result from changes in wage setting institutions that
may serve to “standardize” wages within jobs and across firms and/or industries. 
This supply-demand-institution (SDI) explanation for wage structure changes has three parts
[Freeman and Katz (1994)].  The first is that different demographic and skill groups are assumed to
be imperfect substitutes in production.  Thus shifts in the supply of and demand for labor skills can
alter wage and employment outcomes.  Potential important sources of shifts in the relative demand
among skill groups include skill-biased technological change, non-neutral changes in other input
prices or supplies (e.g., capital-skill complementarity), product market shifts, and the forces of4
globalization (trade and outsourcing).  Sources of relative supply shifts include variation in cohort
size, changes in access to education and incentives for educational investments, and immigration.
The second part is that the same underlying demand and supply shocks may have differential
effects on relative wages and employment depending on differences in wage-setting and other labor
market institutions.  The stronger the role of wage-setting institutions and the less responsive the
institutions are to changes in market forces, the more the impact is likely to fall on employment
rather than on wages.  Regulations governing hiring and firing as well as differences in educational
and training institutions may also affect how the wage structure responds to market shifts.  
Third, institutional changes themselves, such as product market deregulation and changes
in the extent of unionization or degree of centralization of collective bargaining, can also alter the
wage structure.  A key issue in assessing the impact of institutional forces on changes in the wage
structure  is determining the extent to which the institutional changes are “exogenous” developments
(such as changes in the political climate) or  largely reflect responses to supply and demand changes.
 
This tension between the proper interpretation of how institutions affect wage setting has led
to the development of two broad empirical approaches.  The first attempts to explain actual relative
wage and employment changes using a supply-demand framework and (implicitly) attributes
anomalies to institutional factors or unmeasured supply and demand shifts [e.g., Autor, Katz, and
Krueger (1998), Katz and Murphy (1992), Murphy and Welch (1992)].  The second takes
institutional  changes as exogenous and first attempts to adjust observed wages for the impact of
institutional changes and then analyzes the remaining “adjusted” wage changes using a supply and
demand framework [e.g., Bound and Johnson (1992), Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996)].  A key5
outstanding conceptual and practical issue in this second approach is how to model the impact of
institutions on employment  as well as wages.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2 documents the changes in
the U.S. wage structure over the past three decades and places these changes into longer-term
historical perspective.  The U.S. wage structure has widened along several dimensions since the late
1970s, including increases in residual wage inequality as well as wage differentials by education and
experience, but differences in the time patterns of these changes suggest they partially reflect
distinctive phenomena. The U.S. data and burgeoning recent literature on U.S. wage structure
changes are used to illustrate the importance of alternative measurement choices for inferences
concerning changes in overall wage inequality and different components of the wage structure.  The
extent to which changes in cross-section wage inequality reflect transitory or permanent components
of individual life-cycle earnings variation is also examined.  Section 3 briefly summarizes recent
changes in the wage distributions of other advanced nations.
Section 4 develops the SDI framework for studying wage structure changes.  Section 5
examines supply and demand models of wage structure changes and assesses the importance of
different supply and demand factors in recent and longer-term U.S. wage structure.  Section 6
examines the role of changes in labor market institutions and the incidence of labor market rents on
changes in the U.S. wage structure.  The role of changes in the incidence of industry rents, the
decline in unionization, and changes in the minimum wage are highlighted.  
The relative earnings of more-educated workers have increased substantially in the United
States since 1950 despite large increases in the relative supply of the more-educated.  Rapid secular
growth in the relative demand for more-skilled workers appears to be a key component of any1Key studies documenting the recent evolution of the  U.S. wage distribution include Bernstein and Mishel
(1997), Blackburn, Bound, and Freeman (1990), Bound and Johnson (1992), Buchinsky (1994), Davis and
Haltiwanger (1991), Freeman (1997), Hamermesh (1998), Gottschalk (1997), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993),
Karoly (1993), Katz and Murphy (1992), Katz and Revenga (1989), Levy and Murnane (1992), Murphy and Welch
(1992, 1997), and Pierce (1997).
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consistent explanation for the long-run evolution of the U.S. wage structure.  Part of this relative
demand shift is accounted for by observed shifts in industrial structure, most arises from within-
sector skill upgrading which may reflect skill-biased technological change.  Fluctuations in the
educational wage differentials (e.g., the narrowing of the U.S. college wage premium in the 1970s
and its substantial widening in the 1980s) are accounted for by fluctuations in the rate of growth of
college workers, institutional changes (e.g., the decline of unions in the 1980s), and possibly by
some recent acceleration in the pace of demand shifts favoring the more-skilled.   Section 7
summarizes the key implications for future research.
2.  Changes in the U.S. Wage Structure
We shall use the recent U.S. experience to illustrate alternative approaches to measuring and
explaining wage structure changes.  A large and growing literature documents and attempts to
explain changes in the U.S. wage structure over the past two decades.
1    Many researchers using a
variety of data sets — including both household and establishment surveys — have found that wage
inequality and skill differentials in earnings increased sharply in the United States from the late
1970s to the mid-1990s.  There is substantial agreement among researchers and data sets concerning
some of the basic “facts” that need to be explained.
Recent changes in the U.S. wage structure can be summarized as follows:
1.  Wage dispersion increased substantially for both men and women from the end of the 1970s
to the mid-1990s.  The weekly earnings of the 90th percentile worker relative to the 10th2For example, Hall and Liebman (1998) document that the mean (median) real total compensation of Chief
Executive Officers of large, publicly-traded U.S. corporations increased by 270 percent (140 percent) from 1982 to
1994, as compared to an increase in real average total compensation per employee for entire economy of 7 percent
over the same period.  They also find that the  mean salaries of players in Major League Baseball and the National
Basketball Association increased by 207 percent and 378 percent respectively from 1982 to 1994.
3These conclusions about real wage growth are based on using the chain-weighted personal consumption
expenditures (PCE) deflator from the National Income and Product Accounts to deflate nominal earnings measures.   
Readers should remember that conclusions concerning changes in real earnings are clearly sensitive to potentially
large biases official price indices arising from difficulties in measuring quality change and the value of new goods
(Boskin et al., 1996; Moulton, 1997).  Such biases in price deflators do not affect the estimates of relative wage
changes that are the focus of this chapter.  Furthermore, most estimates in the literature indicate the real earnings of
young, less-educated men declined from 1979 to 1995 even assuming an upward bias in the PCE deflator of 1% a
year.     
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percentile worker increased by over 25 percent for both men and women from 1979 to 1995.
The available evidence suggests earnings inequality has expanded even more dramatically
if one includes the very top end (top 1 percent) of the distribution.
2 This pattern of rising
wage inequality was not offset by changes in non-wage compensation favoring the low-wage
workers.
2. Wage differentials by education, occupation, and age (experience) have increased.  The
relative earnings of college graduates and those with advanced degrees increased
dramatically in the 1980s. But the gender differential declined both overall and for all age
and education groups in the 1980s and 1990s.
3. Wage dispersion expanded within demographic and skill groups.  The wages of individuals
of the same age, education, and sex (and even those working in the same occupation and
industry) were much more unequal in the mid-1990s than two decades earlier.
4. Increased cross-section earnings inequality over the past two decades has not been offset by
increased year-to-year earnings mobility.  Permanent and transitory components of earnings
variation have risen by similar amounts [Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994)].  Thus year-to-year
earnings instability has also increased.
5. Since these wage structure changes have occurred in a period of rather slow mean real wage
growth, the real earnings of less-educated and lower-paid workers (especially young, less-
educated) males appear to be lower in the 1990s than those of analogous workers two
decades earlier.
3  The employment rates of less skilled workers also appear to have fallen
relative to those of more skilled workers [Juhn (1992), Levinson (1998), Murphy and Topel
(1997)].
6. Rising earnings inequality has been the dominant contributor to a substantial increase in
family income inequality both from greater dispersion in the earnings of household heads
and from an increased correlation in the earnings of husbands and wives [e.g., Karoly and
Burtless (1995)].  Inequality of consumption expenditures also expanded from the late 1970s4A related hypothesis is motivated by the spectacular increases in earnings at the extreme top end of the
distribution, the rise of within-group inequality even within detailed occupations, and by Rosen’s (1981) model of
the economics of superstars.  This approach emphasizes how changes in technology (especially those reducing
communications and transportation costs) may allow the relatively highest ability individuals to sell their services to
a greatly expanded market and lead to a increased concentration of economic rewards within occupations [Frank and
Cook (1995)].  This hypothesis seems potentially quite relevant for performing artists and possibly many
professionals, but it has yet to receive much careful empirical scrutiny to determine its broader relevance for
understanding wage structure changes.
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to the early 1990s is also apparent if one examines consumption measures [e.g., Cutler and
Katz (1991); U.S. Department of Labor (1995)]. 
Thus rising U.S. wage inequality in the 1980s and 1990s has been accompanied by large increases
in wage differentials by skill group and by much greater residual inequality (within group wage
dispersion). The major exception to this pattern of a widening wage structure has been the
substantial narrowing of wage differentials between men and women.  An important motivation for
understanding these wage structure changes is that diverging U.S. labor market outcomes appear to
have translated into increased inequality in economic well-being among individuals and households
from the 1970s to the mid-1990s.  
Much debate exists concerning the causes of  recent expansions in U.S. wage inequality and
educational wage differentials.  Several prominent (and not necessarily exclusive) explanations have
been offered.  The first attributes wage structure changes to an increased rate of growth of the
relative demand for highly educated and “more-skilled” workers driven by skill-biased technological
changes, largely associated with the spread of computers and microprocessor-based technologies
in the workplace [Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994), Bound
and Johnson (1992), Mincer (1991)].
4  The second explanation focuses on the role of rising
globalization pressures (particularly increased trade with less-developed countries and greater
foreign outsourcing) in reducing manufacturing production employment and thereby shrinking the9
relative demand for the less educated and leading to the loss of wage premia (rents) paid to blue
collar workers in some manufacturing industries [Borjas and Ramey (1995), Feenstra and Hanson
(1996), Wood (1994, 1995, 1998)].  The third attributes rising skill differentials in the 1980s and
1990s to a slowdown in the rate of growth of the relative supply of skills because of a decline in the
size of the cohorts entering the labor market and an increased rate of unskilled immigration [Borjas,
Freeman, and Katz (1997), Katz and Murphy (1992), Murphy and Welch (1992)].  A fourth
explanation emphasizes changes in labor market institutions including the decline in unionization,
erosion of the real and relative value of the minimum wage, and changes in wage setting norms
[DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), Freeman (1996), Lee (1998)]. 
Before attempting to evaluate these alternative explanations, we need to develop a more
detailed understanding of both recent and historical changes in the U.S. wage structure and of how
changes in the U.S. compare with those in other advanced countries.  We further document the
evolution of the U.S. wage structure in this section and briefly summarize changes in other countries
in section 3.
Much of our knowledge of changes in the U.S. wage structure comes from individual level
earnings data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), the basic monthly household survey that
is also the source of official U.S. unemployment and labor force data.  Annual earnings data and
weeks worked for the previous calendar year is collected in the Annual Demographic Supplement
to the March CPS.  Public use micro data from the March CPS is available starting with March 1964
and thereby providing earnings distribution information starting in 1963.   Analogous data on annual
earnings and weeks for the previous calendar year is available from the Public Use Micro Samples
(PUMS) of the decennial Census of Population from 1940 to 1990 (covering earnings data for 19395Analyses of wage inequality trends using these other household surveys  — the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP), the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), and the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) —  include Bernstein and Mishel (1997), Buchinsky and Hunt (1996), Gottschalk and Moffitt
(1992, 1994, 1998),  Haider (1997), and Lerman (1997).  Studies using establishment-level data sets include Davis
and Haltiwanger (1991), Groshen and Levine (1997), and Pierce (1997).
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to 1989).  Data on usual weekly earnings for all wage and salary workers and the hourly wage for
hourly workers is available in the May CPS from 1973 to 1978 and monthly in the Outgoing
Rotation Groups (ORGs) since 1979.  A robust finding of rising overall wage inequality and
education/skill differentials from 1979 to the mid-1990s is apparent in the March CPS, the 1980 and
1990 Census PUMS samples, the CPS ORG samples, other household surveys, as well as some
available establishment surveys.
5  But some of the nuances of the timing and patterns of changes in
the wage structure (especially patterns of changes in within-group or residual inequality) are
somewhat sensitive to choice of data set and the precise sample and earnings concept used.
This section first summarizes changes in the U.S. wage structure from 1963 to 1995 using
data from the March CPSs.  The robustness of these findings across data sets and to alternative
measurement decisions is then explored.  The recent changes are also compared to longer-term
historical trends and used to illustrate alternative approaches to decomposing changes in the wage
structure (between-group vs. within-group components, permanent vs. transitory components or
earnings variation, and changes in “quality” between cohorts vs. changes in skill prices within
cohorts).
2.1 Changes in the U.S. Wage Structure, 1963-95, March CPS Data
Changes in the U.S. wage structure over the past several decades are illustrated using data
on the weekly earnings of full-time, full-year, wage and salary workers (those working 35 hours or6Information on weeks worked and usual weekly hours in the previous calendar year is available in the
March CPS starting in 1976 (providing data for 1975); the earlier March CPSs only provided bracketed weeks
worked information and hours worked last week.  A full-time/part-time work indicator for the previous year is
consistently available in all years of the March CPS public use samples.  Comparisons of features of the distribution
of  annual or weekly earnings for full-time, full-year workers can be made rather consistently since 1963, but
analyses of hourly wages or of broader sets of workers are much more consistent with a focus on data since 1975. 
The Census PUMSs prior to 1980 have similar limitations and do not contain a measure of usual weeks worked in
the previous year.  Alternative approaches to imputing hours worked in the previous calendar year in the early March
CPS and Census PUMS samples are discussed in Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce
(1993), Katz and Murphy (1992), and Murphy and Welch (1992).  The basic broad patterns of changes in hourly
wage distributions for full-time workers or all workers using these imputation techniques prior to 1975 are similar to
those of weekly wages of full-time, full-year workers.
7Nominal wages are converted into constant dollars using PCE deflator.
8Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) reach similar conclusions concerning the sensitivity of conclusions about
inequality trends for men to alternative measurement and sample choice decisions using the March CPS data.
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more per week and working at least 40 weeks in the previous calendar year) from the March CPSs
of 1964 to 1996 (covering earnings from 1963 to 1995).
6  The core sample is further restricted to
adults prior to retirement age (those aged 19 to 65 at the survey date), without allocated earnings,
who earned at least $67 per week in  1982 dollars (equal to one-half of the 1982 real minimum wage
based on a 40 hour week).
7  Weekly earnings are imputed for those with top-coded earnings by
multiplying value of the top code by 1.5.  The qualitative aspects of the findings are not very
sensitive to these restrictions and imputations with the exception of the treatment of outliers with
extremely low weekly earnings.  When workers with extremely low reported weekly earnings are
kept in the sample, we find a pronounced (and implausibly large) reduction in most measures of
inequality (especially for women) in the 1960s.
8  The findings reported in this section are quite
similar to those of other analyses of the March CPS data including Gottschalk (1997), Juhn, Murphy
and Pierce (1993), Karoly (1993), Katz and Murphy (1992), and Murphy and Welch (1992, 1997).
Figure 1 (following the approach of Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993)) plots the change in
log real wages by percentile for both men and women from 1963 to 1995.  The figure displays a9The convention used in this chapter is to refer to log changes multiplied by 100 as changes in log points.
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substantial widening of both the male and female wage distributions with the wages of  workers in
the upper  end (the 90th percentile) rising by approximately 40 percent (34 log points)  relative to
those in the lower end (the 10th percentile) for both men and women.
9  There is essentially no real
wage gain  from 1963 to 1995 for men in the bottom quarter of the distribution.  The divergence of
earnings is not limited to comparisons of workers at the top and the bottom.  The figure indicates
an almost linear spreading out of the entire wage distribution for women and for the wage
distribution above the 30th percentile for men.  Figure 1 also shows that women gained on men
throughout the wage distribution with the earnings of the median woman rising  27 percent (23 log
points) relative to the median man from 1963 to 1995.   Figure 2 illustrates that the overall wage
distribution (men and women combined) also spread out substantially over the past few decades,
especially in the top half of the distribution.
The four panels of Figure 3 decompose changes in wage inequality (and real earnings) from
1963 to 1995 for men and women into 4 sub-periods (1963-71, 1971-79, 1979-87, and 1987-95) that
roughly correspond to the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.  There are some striking differences
across the sub-periods.  There is little overall change in wage inequality and rapid real wage growth
for both men and women in the 1960s.  Real wage growth slows down in the 1970s and some
widening begins in the bottom half of the distribution for males.  There is essentially no change in
the gender gap from 1963 to 1979.  The  rise in wage inequality for both men and women over the
entire 1963 to 1995 period is dominated by the rapid spreading out of the male and female wage
distributions from 1979 to 1987.  This pattern of rising inequality continues in a more modest from
for 1987 to 1995.  Similarly the gender gap narrows in the 1980s and 1990s.  10Important changes in wage differentials by race, ethnicity, and immigrant status have also occurred over
the past several decades.  In particular, the black/white wage differential narrowed substantially from the mid-1960s
to the mid-1970s , but shows little change over the past two decades and some erosion of progress for young workers
[e.g., Heckman and Donohue (1991)].  These dimensions of wage structure changes are beyond the scope of this
chapter.  See the chapter by Altonji and Blank (1998) on racial wage differentials and the chapter by Borjas (1998)
on relative wage movements by immigration status.
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Figure 4 gives a sense of the full time series of changes in inequality for men and women by
plotting the 90-10 log wage differential by sex annually from 1963 to 1995.   Table 1 summarizes
alternative measures of wage inequality for all, men, and women for selected years from 1963 to
1995.  The Gini coefficient, standard deviation of log wages, and 90-10 log wage differential show
somewhat similar patterns of increases in inequality for all, men, and women.  The standard
deviation of log wages is a useful summary measure of wage dispersion if wages are approximately
log normal, but is much more sensitive to extreme outliers at the top and the bottom than are the
reported quantile measures of wage dispersion.  The Gini coefficient is quite sensitive to shifts in
earnings in the middle of the distribution.  Rising wage inequality has occurred in both the top and
bottom halves of the wage distributions.
The changes in overall earnings inequality summarized in Figures 1 to 4 and Table 1 reflect
changes in wage differentials between demographic/skill groups and changes in inequality within
groups.  Table 2 summarizes the between-group changes by presenting log real wage changes from
1963 to 1995 for various groups defined by education, potential experience (age), and sex.
10  Mean
(predicted) log real weekly earnings were computed in each year for 64 detailed sex-education-
experience groups and mean wages for broader groups in each year are weighted averages of the
relevant sub-group means using a fixed set weights (the 1980 share of total hours worked from the11The 64 sex-education-experience groups are based on a breakdown of the data into 2 sexes, 8 education
categories (0-8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13-15, 16-17, and 18+ years), and 4 potential experience categories (1-10, 11-20, 21-
30, and 31+ years).  Changes in the coding of education in the CPS starting in 1992 make it difficult to be fully
consistent over time in defining education groups.  We follow the approach suggested by Jaeger (1997a) in forming
“consistent” education categories before and after the data changes.  To make sure changes from 1987 to 1995 are
not driven by changes in the education codes, the wage change for each group from 1990 to 1991 is calculated for
full-time workers using the CPS Outgoing Rotation Groups which use the old education codes for each of these
years and the 1987 to 1995 March CPS change is adjusted for the difference between the CPS ORG and March CPS
change from 1990 to 1991.  Log weekly wages of full-time, full-year workers are regressed each year separately by
sex on the dummy variables for the 8 consistent education categories, a quartic in experience, 3 region dummies,
black and other race dummies, and interactions of the experience quartic with 3 broad education categories (high
school graduate, some college, and college plus).  The (composition-adjusted) mean log wage for each of the 64
groups in a given year is the predicted log wage from these regressions evaluated for whites, living in the mean
region based on the 1980 Census distribution of employment, at the relevant experience level (5, 15, 25 or 35 years
depending on the experience group).  Potential experience in the earnings year (previous calendar year) is measured
as survey data age minus years of schooling minus 7.
12Real wage growth from 1963 to 1995 for both men and women is much more rapid when one uses the
simple (unweighted) average weekly wage of full-time, full-year workers, rather than the fixed-weighted averages
presented in Table 2.  We find the unweighted average of log weekly wages increased by 0.36 for women and 0.16
for men from 1963 to 1995.  Educational upgrading (rather than changes in the age distribution of workers) largely
accounts for the faster growth in simple average wages than in fixed-weighted averages holding the education-
experience composition of the workforce constant.  Murphy and Welch (1992) report similar results for different
measures of real wage growth for males from 1963 to 1989.
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198O Census PUMS sample) to adjust for compositional changes within these broader groups.
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The first row of Table 2 indicates that (composition-adjusted) real wages grew by 7 percent (or 6.6
log points) over the entire period, but this growth reflects rapid growth in the 1960s and modest
declines since the early 1970s.   This measure of real wage growth differs from standard measures
in being a geometric (rather than arithmetic) mean and by reflecting wages for a fixed demographic
distribution.  Hence it does not reflect changes in the level of wages arising from shifts in the
education, gender, or experience composition of the work force.
The next two rows of Table 2 indicate that the (fixed-weight) mean log wage of women
increased by 15 log points relative to men from 1963 to 1995 with the improvement almost entirely
concentrated in the 1980s and 1990s.
12  In fact, the earnings of women increased relative to those
of men in almost all education-experience categories from 1979 to 1995.  Panel A of Figure 515
illustrates the similar time pattern of changes in the female/male log wage differential for high
school graduates (those with 12 years of schooling) and college graduates (those with 16 or more
years of schooling). 
The next six rows of Table 2 show the evolution of real wages by education group.  The real
wage changes are, for the most part,  increasing by education group over the full period reflecting
a rise in education-based wage differentials (particularly a sharp increase in the relative earnings of
those with at least a college degree).  The changes in educational wage differentials differ
substantially across sub-periods.  College graduates (particularly those with 18 or more years of
schooling) gained substantially in the 1960s, but the college wage premium narrowed (especially
for younger workers in the 1970s).  Educational wage differentials increased sharply from 1979 to
1987 with the college plus/high school was differential rising by 12 log points.  The relative earnings
of college graduates continued rising into the 1990s, but those with some college have done
particularly poorly in the 1990s.  The much studied time pattern of the overall college/high school
wage differential and the college/high school wage differential for young workers (those with 5
years of schooling) are shown in panel B of Figure 5.  Occupational wage differentials (e.g., the
earnings of professional and managerial workers relative to production workers) also narrowed in
the 1970s and then exploded in the 1980s [Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1990), Murphy and
Welch (1993a)].
The bottom rows of Table 2 summarize changes in real wages for older versus younger males
both overall and for high school and college graduates separately.  Over the entire sample period,
the wage gap between older and younger males expanded with the earnings of peak earners, those
with 25 to 35 years of experience, rising by 12 log points relative to younger workers with 5 years16
of experience.  The differences in time pattern of changes in experience differentials for high school
and college graduates are shown in panel C of Figure 5.  Experience differentials rose more sharply
for college graduates in the 1960s and 1970s, then increased rapidly in the early 1980s for high
school graduates and narrowed in the 1980s for college graduates.  The overall change for both high
school and college graduates had involved substantial increases in the relative earnings of peak
earners to young workers.  Wage differences by age (potential experience) also expanded for women
in the 1980s [Gottschalk (1997), Katz, Loveman, and Blanchflower (1995)].
We have so far considered wage differentials for groups distinguished by sex, education, and
age/experience.  But these factors account for only about one third of overall wage variation so that
changes in wage dispersion within these groups are likely to be an important part of changes in the
overall wage inequality.  Residual (or within-group) inequality is examined here by looking at
changes in the distribution of log wage residuals from separate regressions by sex each year of log
weekly wages on a full set of 8 education dummies, a quartic in experience, interactions of the
experience quartic with 3 broad education categories, 3 region dummies, and 2 race dummies.  Panel
D of Figure 5 and Table 3 summarize the time pattern of changes in the log wage differential
between the 90th and 10th percentiles of the residual wage distribution.  Residual log weekly wage
inequality for full-time, full-year workers increased substantially by 27 log points for men and 25
log points for women from 1963 to 1995.  Residual wage inequality started increasing in the 1970s
and continued rising rapidly in the 1980s and at a somewhat slower pace in the 1990s.  The rise in
wage inequality within groups suggests that the “least-skilled” or least-lucky” workers within each
category as well as less-educated and less-experienced workers have seen their relative earnings
decline substantially over the past two decades.  But the time patterns of changes in within group17
inequality, educational wage differentials, and experience differentials are distinctive.
In summary, we conclude from the March CPS data on the weekly wages of full-time, full-
year (FTFY) workers that overall U.S. wage inequality for both men and women expanded from the
early 1960s to the mid-1990s, with changes in the 1980s accounting for much of the increase.
Between- and within-group inequality increases both contributed to rising wage dispersion.  More
specifically, the college wage premium rose from 1963 to 1971, declined substantially in the 1970s,
increased sharply in the 1980s, and continued to rise at a more modest pace in the first half of the
1990s.  Experience differentials also expanded from 1963 to 1995.  Relative earnings declines for
young workers are largest in the 1970s for college workers and in the 1980s for the less educated.
Residual wage inequality is rather stable in the 1960s, starts to increase for men in the 1970s, and
increases dramatically for men and women from 1980 to 1995.  After remaining fairly stable in the
1960s and 1970s, male/female wage differentials narrowed substantially in the 1980s and 1990s.
The narrowing of the gender gap in earnings means that overall wage inequality for men and women
combined increased by much less than wage inequality for either men or women analyzed
separately.  The 90-10 log weekly wage differential for all FTFY workers increased by 19 log points
from 1979 to 1995 as compared to increasing by 27 log points for men and 31 log points for women
over the same period.
Changes in the U.S. wage structure over the past several decades seem, at least superficially,
consistent with a general rise in the labor market returns to “skill.”  The returns to observed skill
proxies (education, occupation,  and experience) have increased, and some interpret the rise in
within group inequality as reflecting a rise in the returns to unobserved skills [Juhn, Murphy, and
Pierce (1993)].  An increase in the gap between the rate of growth of the relative demand for more-18
skilled workers and the relative supply of such workers represents a potential market-driven
explanation for rising skill returns.  The substantial decline in the gender gap since 1979 might
reflect increased relative skills (e.g., actual experience and training) within education-age groups
or shifts in labor demand favoring more female-intensive labor market segments (industries,
occupations, particular skills).  An alternative interpretation for the widening between and within
group inequality is  a weakening of labor market institutions and norms that compressed wages both
across and within skill groups.    
2.2 Robustness of Wage Structure Trends Across Data Sources
The basic pattern of wage structure changes from the early 1960s to the mid-1990s
documented in this section for the weekly wages of FTFY workers appear rather robust and is
consistent with other studies using data on weekly and hourly wages for a wide variety of samples
from the March CPSs, Census PUMS, and the CPS May samples and ORGs [e.g, Gottschalk (1997),
Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), and Katz and Murphy (1992) with the March CPSs; Bernard and
Jenson (1998) with the Census PUMS; Bound and Johnson (1992), DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux
with (1996), and Bernstein and Mishel (1997) with the CPS May and ORG samples].  While we
focus on the March CPS in this chapter because it provides the longest consistent U.S. earnings
series collected at high frequency, we briefly compare trends in inequality measures in the March
CPS with other U.S. data sources below.  
A. Educational differentials
Table 3 provides comparisons of annualized log changes in the college-plus/high school,
some college/high school and high school/ninth-grade wage differentials for weekly and hourly13 The March CPS sample covers 1963-95, the May CPS sample covers 1973-79, the ORG sample covers 1979-96,
and the Census PUMS covers 1959-89.  All estimates of changes in wage differentials are calculated as 10 times
annualized log changes to facilitate comparisons among data sources that may only be available for part of a decade
(e.g., the March sample for 1963-69).  Wage differentials are estimated from separate cross-sectional log earnings
regressions in each year by gender and with genders combined.  See the table note for further details.
14 As noted, March samples exclude those earning less than ½ the 1982 minimum wage in real dollars.  Allocation
flags are not available for May CPS samples and hence allocated observations are retained.
15 Census samples are weighted by weeks worked in the previous year rather than hours in the previous week.
16 Implausibly large growth in the high-school/9
th grade differential during the 1990s is most likely due to changes to
the education question after 1992.
17 As noted previously, the March data for the 1960s are quite sensitive to the treatment of extremely low hourly
earnings.
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earnings for the years 1959 – 1996 using (as available) data from the March CPS, May CPS, CPS
Outgoing Rotation Groups, and Census PUMS.
13 All samples exclude allocated observations, the
lowest one-percent of earners, and those whose hourly wage exceeds the top-coded value for full-
time earners.
14  Hourly samples include both full- and part-time workers while weekly earnings
samples are limited to full-time workers and, in the March CPS and Census PUMS, those working
40-plus weeks. Sample weights are used throughout and are multiplied by weekly hours in hourly
wage samples to weight equally all hours of labor input (e.g., DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux, 1996;
Lerman, 1997).
15  Earnings are imputed for top-coded observations by multiplying the value of the
top code by 1.5. 
For the 1960 – 1996 period, trends in educational differentials are highly comparable across
data sources and weekly and hourly samples and are consistent with widely documented findings.
Earnings differentials expand modestly in the 1960s, contract substantially in the 1970s, expand
even more dramatically during the 1980s, and continue to grow at a slower rate in the 1990s.
16  Two
sources of uncertainty are worth noting.  First, in the 1960s, the March CPS data indicate
substantially more growth in the college-plus/high school differential than the Census PUMS, a
pattern driven by very large estimated wage differentials in the March 1963 CPS.
17  Second, due to18 See Jaeger (1997a, 1997b), Polivka (1996), Mishel and Bernstein (1997), and Lerman (1997) for discussion.
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incompatibilities introduced in the CPS education measure in 1992 and the subsequent redesign of
the CPS survey in 1994, estimated trends in inequality metrics are less reliable in the 1990s than in
other periods.
18  
To explore the robustness of these relationships, we have employed a variety of earnings
cutoffs (½ the minimum wage, 1/3
rd the minimum wage, 2% dropped, $0.50 - $250 real hourly
earnings) and sub-samples (white, non-agricultural, white and non-agricultural).  The time pattern
of results in Table 3 is relatively insensitive to these manipulations.
B. Overall and residual earnings inequality
In contrast to our findings on educational ratios, however, trends in overall and residual
inequality as measured by wage quantiles, the Gini coefficient, and the variance of log earnings are
less consistent across data sources and are more sensitive the choice of lower cut-off (i.e., handling
of outliers), top-coding, and choice of sample (full-time, all), earnings concept (weekly, hourly) and
weights (bodies, weeks, labor hours supplied).  
Table 4 presents measures of annualized decadal changes in overall and residual inequality
for the 1959-96 period using the CPS and Census samples as above.  The Census PUMS indicates
modest expansion in overall weekly earnings inequality in the 1960s for men and women separately
and combined, the bulk of which is accounted for by growth in the 90-50 log earnings ratio.  Hourly
earnings inequality for women, however, shows no overall increase during this period and the
female hourly 50-10 ratio contracts slightly.  The March CPS data for the 1960s shows slight overall
contraction in inequality for both weekly and hourly samples, a pattern that is again likely to be
driven by very low earnings values in the 1963 data. 21
The 1970s data present a largely consistent picture of stable between group inequality and
growing residual inequality.  Both March CPS and Census PUMS indicate moderate growth in
overall male earnings inequality for both weekly and hourly earnings concentrated in the lower half
of the distribution and almost entirely accounted for by the growth in the residual.  Trends in male
earnings inequality in the May CPS are comparable, with the exception that the May data show no
growth in overall male weekly earnings inequality as measured by the 90-10 ratio.  All data sources
indicate either no growth or modest contraction of female earnings inequality (overall and residual)
during the 1970s, with a more pronounced contraction visible in hourly samples. 
Overall inequality expands dramatically across all data sources and sub-samples in the 1980s,
with the expansion roughly evenly split between the upper and lower halves of the distribution for
male and pooled-gender samples, and concentrated in the lower half for female samples.  Trends in
residual inequality are less consistent across data sources, however.  While residual inequality
growth accounts for approximately 2/3rds of overall inequality growth in weekly and hourly samples
in March and ORG CPS data during the 1980s, this is not true for the Census PUMS where the
variance of log wage residuals is essentially static between 1979 and 1989 (the 90-10 residual
earnings ratio in the Census indicates modest growth during this period, however).  
An important pattern not visible from Table 4 is that the expansion of earnings inequality
during the 1980s is not smooth but rather is concentrated in the 1979-85 period, particularly for
pooled-gender and male samples. In the ORG and March data, approximately 80 percent of the
growth of overall male inequality, and 90 percent of the growth of pooled-gender inequality, occurs
between 1979-85.  Residual inequality grows somewhat more smoothly during the entire decade,
however, and in particular shows little deceleration for women after 1985, especially in the March19 Inequality measures make discreet upward jumps in 1994 in the ORG and 1993 in the March CPS, coincident with
the redesign of the survey.
22
data. 
Due to the redesign of the CPS, trends in wage inequality during the 1990s are less certain
and a subject of current debate (e.g., Bernstein and Mishel, 1997, Lerman, 1997).  Our reading of
the data is that overall and residual inequality in the upper half of the distribution have continued
to expand modestly during 1989-96 for both pooled-gender and by-gender samples, although the
trend is likely overstated by the survey redesign.
19 
Based on these comparisons of data and methods, we offer the following conclusions.  First,
estimates of educational differentials are quite consistent across data sources, sub-samples, and
earnings concepts.  Second, for most inequality outcomes, trends in full-time weekly earnings and
overall hourly earnings are largely comparable within any given data source and are not particularly
sensitive to the weighting scheme employed (bodies, weeks, or hours).  Third, inferences regarding
the residual distribution of earnings are far less consistent in sign, magnitude, and timing among data
sources and are sensitive to the handling of outliers and selection of sub-samples. Although all data
sources point to a growth of residual inequality starting in the 1970s, the relative magnitude, precise
timing, and sample-specificity of this trend are elusive.  These vagaries are unfortunate because
shifts in the residual earnings distribution are less well understood than ‘between group’ inequality
and, moreover, account, for the preponderance of recent inequality growth by most estimates.  To
make further progress in understanding these trends, researchers should carefully explore the
robustness of their conclusions to choice of data source, sub-sample, and methodology.
2.3 Total Compensation Inequality vs. Wage Inequality23
A sharp increase in U.S. wage inequality from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s is a  well-
documented and robust finding across a wide variety of data sets and studies.  But wages do not
represent the full economic returns to work.  Non-wage employee benefits (fringe benefits), such
as employer pension contributions and employer-provided health insurance, represent a significant
share of total (pecuniary) compensation in the United States.  Aggregate data from the National
Income and Product Accounts indicates that supplements to wages and salaries as a percentage of
total compensation increased rapidly from 7.5 percent in 1959 to 16.5 percent in 1979 to 18.9
percent in 1994, before declining slightly to 17.9 percent in 1996 [Economic Report of the President
(1998, Table B28, p. 312).  Pierce (1997), using a somewhat broader measure of employee benefits,
estimates that non-wage compensation represented 27.3 percent of total employer compensation
costs in 1994.   The nonpecuniary returns to work (working conditions) also vary substantially
among jobs and individuals.  
The interpretation and welfare consequences of rising wage inequality clearly depends on
whether it represents increased inequality in the overall economic returns to work as opposed to a
change in the distribution of the composition of total compensation between wage and non-wage
components.  Thus a crucial research question is the extent to which  changes in wage inequality are
a good proxy for changes in the dispersion of the total economic returns to work.  Research on
changes in the distribution of the overall economic returns to work has been hampered by a lack of
individual-level data sets with information on the incidence and value of non-wage benefits and by
the difficulties involved in measuring and valuing nonpecuniary working conditions. 
   Pierce (1997) represents the most comprehensive study of the inequality of total hourly
compensation ( wage plus non-wage benefits) for the United States.  Pierce examines reasonably24
representative national samples of jobs for 1986 and 1994 using the establishment survey micro data
collected to produce the Employment Cost Index (a quarterly index of total employer compensation
costs).  This data provides information on hourly wages and on the incidence and value (employer
cost) of a wide range of both legally required and voluntary benefits.   Pierce finds that cross-
sectional  compensation inequality is greater than wage inequality.  High wage jobs are more likely
to have specific benefits (especially employer-provided health insurance, pensions, and paid leave)
and a greater value of benefits.  The differences in the incidence of voluntary benefits is especially
large in the bottom-half of the wage (or total compensation) distribution.  Pierce estimates a 90-10
log hourly compensation differential of 1.75 in 1994 as compared to a 90-10 log hourly wage
differential of 1.568.  Thus the cross-section data is suggestive of strong income effects in the
demand for benefits with the benefit share increasing in total compensation.  Furthermore Pierce’s
examination of data from 1986 to 1994 indicates a somewhat larger rise in compensation inequality
than in wage inequality, especially in the bottom half of the compensation distribution.
Information on the incidence (but not on the valuation) of employer-provided health
insurance and pension coverage is periodically available for nationally representative samples of
employees from the Current Population Survey.  These data indicate that changes in the incidence
of employer-provided health insurance and pension coverage have exacerbated relative wage
changes with a substantial decline in the relative likelihood of coverage for less-educated and low-
wage workers from 1979 to the mid-1990s [e.g., Bloom and Freeman (1992), Even and McPherson
(1994),  and Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt (1997a)].  For example, Farber and Levy (1998)
document that the fraction of workers with health insurance from their own employer declined from
0.67 in 1979 to 0.50 in 1997 for high school dropouts as compared to a decline from 0.81 to 0.7625
over the same period for college graduates.     
Hamermesh (1998) provides a fascinating initial attempt to examine changes in the
inequality of (non-pecuniary) workplace amenities.  Hamermesh examines patterns of changes in
inter-industry differentials in both wages and the  total burden of occupational injuries from 1979
to 1995.  He finds a widening of cross-industry inequality in the total burden of injuries with a
relative drop in injuries in industries with rising relative earnings.  Hamermesh similarly finds in
analysis of the timing of work from 1973 to 1991 that the incidence of work at unattractive hours
(evenings and nights) has increased relatively for low-wage workers.  Changes in the distribution
of these workplace amenities also move in the direction of greater inequality in the total economic
returns to work in the United States over the last two decades.
In summary, the limited available evidence strongly indicates that changes in the distribution
of non-wage benefits and nonpecuniary workplace amenities tend to reinforce rather than offset
observed increases in U.S. wage inequality and wage differentials by education.  This is an
important area for future research, but a tentative conclusion is that recent changes in the wage
distribution provide a reasonable proxy for changes in the distribution overall distribution of
economic returns to work.
2.4 Observable and Unobservable Components of Changes in Wage Inequality
Models of wage structure changes emphasizing shifts in the supply and demand for different
labor inputs are likely to be easier to implement and interpret when applied to changes in relative
wages among workers classified by observable skill categories.  It is more difficult to separate out
the contribution of changes in skill prices and quantities to changes in residual wage inequality.26
This raises the question of the extent to which changes in wage inequality reflect changes in the
relative price and quantities of observed worker attributes as opposed to changes in residual
inequality.  
A common approach to assessing the quantitative contributions of observable and
unobservable components of wage dispersion to changes in overall wage inequality is a standard
variance decomposition.  We start with a simple wage equation of the form
(1) Yit = XitBt + uit   
where Yit is the log wage of individual i in year t, Xit is a vector of observed individual
characteristics (e.g., experience and education), Bt is the vector of estimated (OLS) returns to
observable characteristics in t, and uit is the log wage residual (which depends on the prices and
quantities of unobserved skills, measurement error, and estimation error).  The orthogonality of the
predicted values (XitBt) and the residuals (uit) in an OLS regression implies the variance of Yit can
be written as
(2) Var(Yit) = Var(XitBit) + Var(uit).
Thus the variance of log wages can be decomposed into two components: a component measuring
the contribution of observable prices and quantities and the residual variance (a component
measuring the effect of unobservables).  These two components are typically referred to as between-
group and within-group inequality.  The change in variance of log wages between two periods can20The estimates of Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) similarly imply that an increase in residual wage
inequality accounted for approximately 61 percent of the rise in the variance of log weekly wage for full-time, adult,
white males in the March CPSs from 1964 to 1988.  They also find a much larger contribution of the between-group
component in the 1980s.  DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) find using data on hourly wages of all employees
aged 16 to 65 from the CPS ORG samples that the majority (57 percent) of the increase in wage inequality from
1979 to 1988 is accounted for by rising between-group variance. 
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similarly be decomposed (by differencing equation (2)) into the change in the variance in the
predicted values (change in between-group inequality) and the change in the residual variance
(change in within-group inequality).  This approach provides a clean and clear decomposition of
wage inequality into observables and unobservables.  The shortcoming of a reliance only on this
approach is that the variance may not be the only inequality metric of interest especially given the
sensitivity of the variance to changes in the tails of the distribution.
Table 5 presents such a between- and within-group decomposition of the growth of the
variance of log weekly wages from 1963 to 1995 for our basic March CPS samples of full-time, full-
year workers.  Changes in the between-group variance component for men and for women reflect
changes in relative returns to and the distribution of quantities of workers by education, experience,
race, and region.  The growth of residual inequality accounts for about a 60 percent of the increase
in the variance of log weekly wages for both men and women over the full 1963-1995 period.  This
pattern reflects a somewhat more rapid proportional growth in between-group than residual
inequality.  In fact, for males the share of overall variance explained by the observables rises from
the 32 percent in 1963 to 36 percent in 1995.  The narrowing of the gender wage differential since
1979 reduces the between-group variance and implies a quite large contribution (75 percent) of
residual inequality to the growth in overall wage inequality for men and women combined.  The
between group component plays a much larger role in the period of rising educational differentials
and accounts for 47 percent of the growth in male wage inequality from 1979 to 1995.
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Increases in between-group and within-group inequality are both important contributors to
rising U.S. wage inequality over the last several decades.  A full explanation for changes in wage
inequality needs to account not only for changes in returns to observed skill measure, but also for
large changes in within-group inequality.
 A further issue concerning the decomposition of changes in wage inequality into observable
and unobservable components is the extent to which changes in between-group wage inequality
reflects changes in the returns to observed skills as opposed to changes in the distribution of worker
characteristics.   The full-sample distribution accounting scheme developed by Juhn, Murphy, and
Pierce (1993) is a useful approach that allows one to make such assessments for any measure of
inequality (not just the variance).  This approach begins with a simple wage equation such as (1) and
conceptualizes the wage equation residual uit as having two components: an individual’s percentile
in the wage distribution 2it and the distribution function of the residuals Ft( ).  By the definition of
the cumulative distribution function, we can write the residual as
(3) uit = F
–
t
1(2it|Xit),
where F
–
t
1(•|Xit) is the inverse cumulative residual distribution for workers with characteristics
Xit in year t.     
The framework given by equations (1) and (3) decomposes changes in inequality into three
sources: (1) changes in the distribution of individual characteristics (changes in the distribution of
the X’s); (2) changes in the prices on observable skills (changes in the B’s); and (3) changes in the
distribution of residuals.  By defining $ as the average returns to observables over the whole period29
under study and G(•|Xit) to be the average cumulative distribution, we can decompose the level of
inequality into corresponding components using
(4) Yit = Xit$ + Xit(Bt -$) + G
-1(2it|Xit) + [F
–
t
1(2it|Xit) - G
-1(2it|Xit)].   
The first term captures the effect of changing distribution of worker characteristics; the second
measures the effects of changing skill returns; and the third term accounts for changes in the
distribution of the residuals.  This framework allows one to reconstruct the (hypothetical) wage
distribution that would attain with any subset of the components held fixed.  One does not need to
hold any of the components fixed at the average level for the entire sample, one could simulate
hypothetical wage distributions using any base period and replace $ and G(•|Xit) with the values for
a reference period of interest.  
If observable prices and the residual distribution are held fixed so that only observable
quantities are allowed to vary, then wages would be determined by
(5) Y
1
it = Xit$ + G
-1(2it|Xit).
If observable skill returns and quantities are allowed to vary over time with only the residual
distribution held fix, then wages are generated by
  
(6) Y
2
it = XitBt + G
-1(2it|Xit).21For example, Goldin and Margo (1992) find substantial sensitivity of results to the choice of a base period
in using this approach to decompose changes in U.S. wage inequality from 1940 to 1950.
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The recommended approach of Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) is to calculate the
distributions of  Y
1
it , Y
2
it , and Yit for each year studied and to attribute the change through time in
the Y
1
it distribution to changes in observable quantities.  Any additional change in inequality in Y
2
it
beyond inequality changes in Y
1
it is attributed to observable skill returns. Further change in actual
overall inequality of Yit beyond those found in Y
2
it is attributed to residual inequality (changes in
the distribution of residuals).  The advantage of this approach over a standard variance
decomposition is it allows one to look at how changes in each component affected the entire wage
distribution and not just the variance.  A disadvantage of moving away from the variance and
examining other measures of inequality, such as quantile measures like the 90-10 log wage
differential, is that these alternative measures typically do not uniquely decompose into between and
within components.  The actual allocations of changes in inequality to different components  using
the full sample accounting scheme are sensitive to the order in which one does the decomposition.
The order chosen implicitly implies an assignment of interaction terms among the different
components.  Further ambiguities can arise since the specific results also depend on the base period
chosen to hold components of the wage distribution fixed.
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Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) have implemented this approach for several quantile
measures of wage dispersion using March CPS data on adult white males for 1964 to 1988.  Table
6 summarizes their findings for the 90-10 log weekly wage differential.  Increases in residual
inequality account for 56 percent of the rise (.208 of an increase of .373) of the 90-10 log weekly
wage differential from 1964 to 1988.  The contribution of residual inequality to the rise in the 90-10
differential is quite similar to findings from a standard variance decomposition.  Table 6 also31
indicates that almost 80 percent of the contribution of observables to rising inequality for the whole
1964-1988 period from increases in returns to observable skills (experience and education).  In fact,
increase in returns to observed skills (mainly rising educational wage differentials) accounts for the
majority (55 percent) of the increase male wage inequality in the 1980s.  Juhn, Murphy and Pierce
(1993) also report that increased returns to observed skills are more important for the increases in
wage inequality in the upper half of the wage distribution than in the bottom half of the wage
distribution as might be expected from the large increase in returns to college and advanced degrees
in the 1980s.
2.5 Permanent and Transitory Components of Earnings Inequality
An increase in cross-sectional earnings inequality could reflect a rise in the permanent and/or
the transitory component of earnings inequality.  An explanation for the observed rise in cross-
sectional inequality in the United States over the past several decades based on greater returns to
skills (such as schooling and other persistent abilities) implies increased inequality in long-run
(permanent) earnings.  The substantial contribution of expanding educational wage differentials to
growing earnings inequality is consistent with such a scenario.  But the large increase in residual
wage inequality could reflect increased returns to persistent (unobserved) worker attributes or a rise
in transitory earnings variability.   A sharp increase in the returns to (unobserved) skills is likely to
have a much larger impact on long-run earnings inequality than an increase in transitory earnings
instability.  Explanations for increased wage inequality emphasizing the weakening of labor market
institutions (e.g., unions, government wage regulation, internal labor markets) that increase the
exposure of wages to market shocks may be consistent with increased year-to-year earnings32
turbulence.  Understanding the contributions of changes in permanent and transitory components
of earnings variation to increased cross-sectional earnings inequality is helpful for evaluating
alternative hypotheses for wage structure changes and for determining the likely welfare
consequences of rising inequality.  
Following Baker and Solon (1998) and Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995), a rudimentary model
of earnings dynamics allowing for time-varying earnings inequality is given by
(7) yit = pt"i + 8tvit 
where yit is the log earnings of individual i in year t,  "i is individual I’s permanent earnings
component (assumed to be time-invariant in this simple framework) with  variance F
2
", vit is the
transitory earnings component with variance F
2
v, "i and vit are orthogonal to each other, and pt and
8t are time-varying factor loadings on the permanent and transitory components of earnings.  One
interpretation of this framework is that "i reflects persistent worker skills and  pt reflects the time-
varying skill price (returns to skill).  This model implies the variance of yit can be written as
(8) Var(yit) = p
2
t F
2
" + 8
2
t F
2
v .
Equation (8) shows that an increase in either factor-loading generates an increased cross-
sectional earnings dispersion.  The nature of the change in inequality depends on which factor
loading changes.  A persistent rise in pt increases long-run earnings inequality (earnings dispersion
across individuals measured over a long horizon such as a decade or lifetime) as the relative labor33
market advantage of high skill workers is enhanced.  An increase in 8t without an increase in pt
increases cross-section earnings inequality by rising year-to-year earnings volatility, but there is no
increase in the dispersion of long-run earnings.  An increase in pt essentially maintains the rank
order of individuals in the wage distribution, but spreads them out further in a persistent manner.
An increase in 8t leads to more changes in individuals’ order in the earnings distribution, but the
changes are quickly undone. 
Measures of earnings mobility, the rate at which individuals shift positions in the earnings
distribution (i.e., transition across quantiles of the earnings distribution), are closely related to the
importance of permanent and transitory components in earnings variation.  A large contribution of
the permanent component implies that individuals’ earnings are highly correlated over time (those
with low relative earnings in one year are likely to have low relative earnings in other years) and
thereby implies low rates of earnings mobility.  Thus the extent to which changes in cross-sectional
earnings inequality are driven by the permanent or transitory component has  implications for
changes in mobility rates.  A rise in inequality caused solely by an increase in the permanent
component will be associated with a decline in mobility rates.  A rise in transitory component alone
will increase mobility rates.  Equal proportional increases in the permanent and transitory
components will leave mobility rates unchanged even though earnings instability (the variation in
year-to-year changes in log earnings for a typical individual) will be increased.
Since increases in the factor loading for either the permanent or the transitory component in
equation (7) raises the cross-sectional variance of yit, information on the time pattern of the variance
of yit from repeated cross-sections is not sufficient to identify whether pt or 8t has changed.
Information on individual-level autocovariances of earnings is necessary to sort out changes in the22Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994), Haider (1997), and Moffitt and Gottschalk (1997) examine adult males
using the PSID.  Buchinsky and Hunt (1996) examine young workers using the NSLY.  Gittleman and Joyce (1995,
1996) examine adult males and females using March-March matched files from the Annual Demographic Files of
the CPS.  Baker and Solon (1998) provide a sophisticated study of male earnings dynamics and changes in earnings
inequality using a rich longitudinal data set of income tax records for Canada.  See OECD (1997) for a summary of
evidence on recent a changes in earnings mobility among other advanced nations.  Studies of earnings mobility tend
to focus on measures of annual earnings.   
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permanent and transitory components of variance [Baker and Solon (1998)].  Thus longitudinal data
on individual earnings histories are required to assess the contributions of permanent and transitory
components of earnings variation to levels and changes in earnings inequality.    
A burgeoning literature has attempted to examine the contribution of permanent and
transitory components of earnings variation to recent changes in U.S. earnings inequality using data
from several longitudinal data sets (the PSID, NLSY, and March-March matched files from the
CPS).
22   A consistent finding across studies and data sets is that large increases in both the
permanent and transitory components of earnings variation have contributed to the rise in cross-
section earnings inequality in the United States from the late 1970s to the early 1990s.  The increase
in the overall permanent component consists of both the sharp rise in returns to education and a large
increase in the apparent returns to other persistent (unmeasured) worker attributes.  The rise in cross-
sectional residual inequality for males (controlling for experience and education) in the 1980s seems
to consist of approximately equal increases in the permanent and transitory factors [Moffitt and
Gottschalk (1995)].
Gottschalk and Moffitt’s (1994) simple decomposition of the change in the variance of  log
earnings from the 1970s to the 1980s for male household heads in the PSID provides an illustrative
set of results.  Gottschalk and Moffitt sub-divide their data into two nine-year periods, 1970-78 and
1979-87.  After adjusting earnings for life-cycle earnings growth (controlling for an experience23This approach could be justified by an earnings dynamics model such as equation (1) if pt and 8t are fixed
within each nine-year period but allowed to differ across the two nine-year periods.
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profile), they calculate for each individual the mean of his log earnings over the nine-year period
(permanent earnings) and the deviation of his log earnings from the mean in each year (transitory
earnings).  The variance of permanent log earnings in each nine-year period is the variance of these
nine-year means across individuals.  They calculate the variance of transitory log earnings by
computing the variance of the nine transitory components separately for each individual and then
averaging them across individuals.
23  
Table 7 summarizes some of the key findings of Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994).  The
permanent and transitory variances both increased by about 40 percent from the 1970s to the 1980s.
The similar proportional increases in transitory and permanent variances imply little change in
earnings mobility.  Roughly two-thirds of the increase in earnings variance (for both annual and
weekly earnings) from the 1970s to the 1980s is accounted for by the permanent component, but the
rise in earnings instability is still quantitatively significant.  The changes in permanent and transitory
variance are of similar magnitude when one looks within education groups (controls for much of the
increase in returns to education).  The increase in earnings instability appears largest for less
educated workers.  
The implicit model of earnings dynamics used by Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) is quite
restrictive.  For example, recent research on earnings dynamics provides evidence of (1) persistent
heterogeneity across individual not only in their level of earnings but also in their life-cycle growth
rates; (2) the possibility of an important random-walk component to earnings; and (3) serial
correlation in transitory shocks to earnings [e.g., Baker (1997); Abate and Card (1989)].  But more
sophisticated empirical analyses that use more realistic (and complicated) models of earnings36
dynamics reach similar conclusions of substantial contributions of both permanent and transitory
variances to the rise in cross-sectional earnings variance and little change in earnings mobility rates
[e.g., Haider (1997); Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995)].
A complete explanation for the recent rise in U.S. wage inequality needs to account for both
a growth in transitory earnings volatility and a large increase in the permanent variance component
that appears associated with higher returns to education and other persistent worker attributes.  The
rise of earnings instability appears to be a bit of a puzzle for hypotheses only emphasizing rising
skill prices associated with increased growth in the demand for skills relative to the supply of skills.
A period of rapid skill-biased technological change associated with the spread of computer-based
technologies and new organizational practices could both increase the relative demand for skill and
(at least in a transition period) generate greater earnings instability since firms are likely to have
much initial uncertainty concerning the abilities of individual workers’ to perform new tasks and
adapt to a new organizational environment.  Rodrik (1997) has argued that increased globalization
and international capital mobility can also increase earnings instability by making labor demand
curves more elastic so that shocks to product market prices have a larger impact on wages.  An
important agenda for future work is to attempt to examine the extent to which patterns of changes
in transitory earnings variability are related to changes in technology, organizational and personnel
practices, exposure to international competition, changes in domestic product market competition,
and changes in unionization and other labor market institutions. 
2.6 Cohort vs. Time Effects in Inequality and the Returns to Education
The interpretation of recent increases in educational wage differentials and of within-group24Card and Lemieux (1996) provide an interesting formal assessment of the extent to which an increase in
the returns to a single index of skill can account for the observed pattern of changes in wage differentials by
education and age and in residual wage dispersion for the United States during the 1980s.  They find that such a
“single-index” model of skills provides a fairly accurate, but overly simplified, description of wage structure changes
for white men and white women from 1979 to 1989.
25A distinctive but related alternative hypothesis is that estimated changes in  educational wage differentials
reflect changes in the returns to unobserved ability rather than changes in “true” returns to education [e.g., Cawley,
Heckman, and Vytlacil (1998)].  Changes in the returns to unobserved ability could lead to changes in ability bias
even with unchanging distributions of unobserved ability within and between cohorts and education groups.  This is
a difficult issue requiring strong and controversial identification assumptions, but our reading is that the limited
available evidence suggests substantial increases in the U.S. college wage premium in the 1980s even after
attempting to account for a rise in returns to unobserved ability [e.g., Chay and Lee (1996)].  
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inequality (at least the persistent component of residual inequality) as largely reflecting increases
in the returns to skills is facilitated by the (implicit) assumption that the distribution of unobserved
ability is relatively similar across successive labor market cohorts.
24  An alternative possibility is that
increased wage inequality may arise from increased dispersion of unobserved labor quality within
recent entry cohorts, possibly from increasingly unequal school quality and diverging social
conditions across neighborhoods.   A decline in the unobserved ability of those with less education
relative to those with more education in younger cohorts could potentially imply a rise in education
returns reflecting an increase in ability bias.
25  In other words, changes in the wage structure could
reflect changes in the average quality of different groups of workers rather than changes in the
average wage for groups of workers of fixed quality.  
Under the assumption that quality is relatively fixed within cohorts after school completion
and labor market entry, these considerations have motivated investigations of the extent to which
changes in inequality and educational differentials reflect changes within as opposed to between
cohorts.  Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) examine within-cohort changes in overall wage inequality
(the 90-10 log weekly wage differential) for six-year experience cohorts of white men.  They find
little within-cohort change in inequality in the 1960s, modest increases in the early 1970s, and large38
increases in the 1980s.  The time pattern of  average within-cohort inequality changes closely track
average within-experience group changes.  And Murphy and Welch (1993b) show that average
within-cohort changes in the college wage premium similarly closely follow average within-
experience group changes with a modest increase in the late 1960s, a decline in the 1970s, and
substantial increases in the 1980s.  Within-cohort changes (time differences) in inequality (or
educational wage differentials) eliminate fixed cohort effects but could represent  age or time effects
or both.  Although one can’t separately identify the levels of cohort, age, and time effects without
very strong assumptions, a differences-in-differences approach of comparing within-cohort changes
for different cohorts going through the same age ranges in different time periods can eliminate age
and cohort effects and leave only changes in the time effect (the change in inequality growth over
time).  For example, a comparison of the change in inequality in the 1980s for the cohort aged 25-29
in 1980 to the change in inequality in the 1970s for the cohort aged 25-29 in 1970 provides an
estimate of the difference in the time effect for the 1980s to the time effect for the 1970s.  
Thus the findings of Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) shows an accelerating increase in
inequality with time from the 1960s to the 1980s that cannot be explained by any combination of
age and cohort effects.  The sharp swings in within-cohort changes in educational wage differentials
across decades (and even shorter periods in which changes in labor force composition are quite
small) also strongly suggest that fluctuations through time in the college wage premium largely
reflect changes in the relative price of educated labor and are not artifacts of changes in the
composition of the college and high school populations.  
A key role for changes in skill prices in movements in U.S. educational wage differentials
does not imply the  absence of cohort or “vintage” effects in the returns to education.  An26Recent studies using the Census data to examine wage structure changes over the full 1940 to 1990 period
include Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), Juhn (1994), Juhn, Kim and Vella (1996), and Murphy and Welch (1993a).
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exploratory analysis by Card and Lemieux (1998) reject the hypothesis that the return to education
is the same for different cohorts in the U.S. labor market.  Their findings are suggestive of changing
cohort effects in the college wage premium especially among recent U.S. entry cohorts.  The much
larger rise (within-experience group) rise in the college wage premium for younger than older
workers in the 1980s could be attributed to either such changing cohort effects or from the larger
impact of labor market shocks on younger than on older workers.  Freeman’s (1975) “active labor
market” hypothesis postulates that changes in labor market conditions (changes in the supply and
demand for skills) show up most sharply for new entrants because more senior incumbent workers
are partially insulated from shocks by internal labor markets.
2.7 Longer-Term Historical Changes in the U.S. Wage Structure
Many explanations for recent wage structure changes emphasize factors, such as skill-biased
new technologies and reduced barriers to international economic transactions, that are sometimes
characterized as sharp breaks from the past.  But rapid technological progress and reductions in
communications and transportation costs have characterized advanced market economies for a long
historical period stretching back at least to the industrial revolution.  This raises the issue of how
wage structure changes over the past several decades fit into longer-term historical patterns.
Individual-level data on earnings and worker characteristics from the decennial Census of
Population allow one to make reasonably consistent comparisons of wage structure changes
(particularly for full-time, full-year workers) over the 1940 to 1990 period.
26  Nevertheless the 1940
Census PUMS is the first nationally-representative sample with information on both earnings or27The Census collects information on annual earnings in the previous calendar year.  Thus the data in Table
8 actually cover the 1939 to 1989 period.  We focus on non-agricultural workers given the difficulties in measuring
agricultural earnings especially in the early Census samples.
28Goldin and Margo (1992) refer to the 1940s as the period of the “Great Compression.” 
29Juhn (1994) reaches similar conclusions in an analysis of weekly earnings of full-time, white males from
1940 to 1990.
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educational attainment.  Thus the analysis of wage structure changes prior to 1940 is greatly
constrained by data limitations and  requires a focus on changes in wage differentials by occupation
and/or industry [e.g., Chiswick (1979), Cullen (1956), Douglas (1930), Goldin and Katz (1995,
1998), and Williamson and Lindert (1980)] .
Table 8 uses data on log weekly wages of full-time, full-year, non-agricultural workers from
the Census PUMSs to summarize the evolution of overall wage inequality (as measured by the 90-10
log wage differential) and the college wage premium (as measured by the regression-adjusted wage
differential between those with exactly 16 years of schooling and those with exactly 12 years of
schooling) from 1940 to 1990.
27   The existence of a large number of outlier observations with
extremely low weekly earnings (especially for women in 1940) motivates our presentation of overall
inequality measures based on two different approaches to trimming this bottom tail.  The first
approach deletes the lowest 1 percent (and leads to findings that are quite similar to no deletions),
and the second approach (following Juhn (1994)) deletes all individuals who earned less than half
the contemporaneous Federal minimum wage.  This second approach could potentially be
misleading given substantial changes in the coverage and relative generosity of the Federal
minimum wage over the period of study (especially from 1940 to 1950).
    The most striking feature of the data presented in Table 8 is the tremendous narrowing of
wage inequality for both men and women in the 1940s.
28  Wage inequality for men then rises in each
subsequent decade with an acceleration of the pace of widening inequality in the 1980s.
29  The entire41
compression of the wage structure in the 1940s is undone by 1990.  The pattern for women is
roughly similar.   The U.S. wage structure in the 1990s appears to be more unequal than at any point
of time at least since 1940.  The college wage premium also declines substantially in the 1940s, rises
modestly in the 1950s and 1960s, narrows in the 1970s, and then sharply expands in the 1980s.  Juhn
(1994) shows that a wide variety of measures of educational and occupational wage differentials
evolve similarly to the college wage premium from 1940 to 1990.  
Overall wage inequality and educational wage differentials have expanded greatly since 1950
despite rapid educational advance and a large increase in the relative supply of more-educated
workers.  Thus strong secular increases in the relative demand for skills is likely to be an important
component of any explanation for U.S. wage structure changes.  The sharp contrast between the
pattern of wage compression in the 1940s (a period of rapid expansion of unions, extremely tight
labor markets for less-skilled workers associated with World War II, and government intervention
in the economy) and of widening inequality in the 1980s (a period of eroding unions and sharp
declines in blue collar employment in manufacturing) is suggestive of the possible importance of
both institutional factors and changes in the relative demands for and supplies of different skill
groups.
The available evidence on occupational wage differentials indicates a substantial decline in
the earnings of white collar workers to blue collar workers from 1890 to 1939 [Goldin and Katz
(1995)].  This decline in the white collar wage premium occurs almost entirely in the decade
surrounding World War I (especially from 1914 to 1919).  The widening of occupational wage
differentials from 1950 to 1990 has been large enough to offset the Great Compression of the 1940s,
but it has not undone the compression that occurred around World War I .  Thus the occupational30See, for example, Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998), Davis (1992), Freeman and Katz (1994, 1995),
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), Haskell and Slaughter (1998), and OECD (1993, 1996, 1997).  The chapter by
Layard and Nickell (1998) examines cross-country differences in labor market institutions and labor market
performance.
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wage structure has probably narrowed over the past century.  The decades surrounding the two
World Wars account for almost all the egalitarian movements in the wage structure in the twentieth
century.  The sources of these seemingly persistent effects of  changes occurring during the period
of the World Wars is an important question for an understanding of the long-run evolution of the
U.S. wage structure.   One possibility is that wars enable the erosion of customary wage differentials
[Phelps Brown (1977)].  The precise timing of the large declines in occupational/educational wage
premiums in the 1910s and 1940s may reflect special factors related to the wars, but their persistence
may reflect the role of market forces related to rapid expansions of the relative supply of more-
educated workers associated with the high school movement after World War I and the growth of
higher education after World War II. 
3. Changes in Other Advanced OECD Countries
Have wage differentials by skill and overall wage inequality increased in other advanced
countries since the late 1970s to the same extent they have in the United States? A number of recent
studies have attempted to assemble as comparable as possible data across advanced nations to
answer this question.
30  Thus, in this section, we provide only a brief summary of the basic patterns
of wage structure changes among advanced OECD nations over recent decades. 
Table 9 classifies twelve countries by the way their educational and/or occupational wage
differentials changed in the 1970s and the 1980s.  During the 1970s, all the countries shared a
common pattern of narrowing wage differentials by skill.  Overall wage dispersion for males also43
narrowed in all of these countries with the exception of the United States.  The trend toward reduced
educational wage differentials and stopped or strongly reversed itself by the mid-1980s in all of
these countries (except South Korea).
Furthermore patterns of changes in educational wage differentials and overall wage
inequality are much more divergent in the 1980s and 1990s than in the 1970s.  Table 10 measures
changes in   overall wage inequality for men from 1979 (or the earliest year available) to 1994 (or
the latest year available) in terms of the 90-10 log wage differential.  The United States and the
United Kingdom experienced sharp increases in overall wage inequality, residual wage inequality,
and, educational and occupational wage differentials of similar magnitude [Katz, Loveman, and
Blanchflower (1995)].  The pattern of declining wage inequality apparent throughout the OECD
(except the United States) in the 1970s ceased in the 1980s and 1990s in almost all nations (with
Germany and Norway as possible exceptions).  Canada, Australia, Japan, and Sweden had modest
increases in wage inequality and educational/occupational differentials starting in the early 1980s.
Wage differentials and inequality narrowed through the mid-1980s in Italy and France with
some hint of expanding in France in the late 1980s and with a large increase in inequality in Italy
in the 1990s following the abolition of an automatic cost-of-living index favoring low-wage workers
(the scala mobile) and the ending of synchronization of bargaining across industries.  New Zealand
also shows large increases in inequality in a period following substantial deregulation of product and
labor markets (OECD, 1996).  
These patterns are suggestive of an important role of differences and changes in labor market
institutions and regulations in explaining the cross-country divergence of wage structure changes44
in the 1980s and 1990s.  But differences in supply and demand factors may also play a role (e.g.,
greater decelerations in the rate of growth of relative skill supply growth in the United States and
Great Britain from the 1970s to the 1980s).  And the existence of either a decline in the relative
wages of the less skilled, a sharp rise in the unemployment of the less skilled, or both in almost all
OECD countries over the past two decades despite expanding relative supplies of highly educated
workers is strongly suggestive of a common shift in labor demand against the less skilled [Bell and
Nickell (1995); Katz (1994); Wood (1994)].  We next develop a framework to assess the roles of
market forces and institutional factors in the evolution of national wage structures.
4.  Conceptual Framework: Supply, Demand, and Institutions
This section develops a supply-demand-institutions (SDI) framework to assess the role of
market forces (supply and demand shifts) and institutional factors in changes in the wage structure.
The specific approach taken borrows from the informal conceptual framework of Freeman and Katz
(1994) and the more formal model of the determinants of between-group wage differentials of
Bound and Johnson (1992).
The basic idea is that the actual wage of an individual can be decomposed into a latent
“competitive” wage (or competitive total compensation level) and a deviation from the competitive
compensation level for that individual.  Actual wages may deviate from the competitive
compensation level because of either institutional/non-competitive forces (unions, minimum wages,
etc.) affecting wage setting or “measurement” problems arising from differences in non-wage
compensation across jobs.  The actual wage for individual i (wi) can be defined as the product of the
competitive wage for i (wic) and a relative rent for i (:i): wi = wic:i.  If the non-wage employment31Studies documenting and evaluating the evidence on inter-industry wage differentials include Slichter
(1950), Krueger and Summers (1988), Katz and Summers (1989), Murphy and Topel (1990), and Gibbons and Katz
(1992).   Groshen (1991) examines U.S. evidence on inter-employer wage differentials within detailed industries.
Lewis (1986) carefully summarizes the U.S. research on union/nonunion wage differentials, and Card (1996)
provides a thoughtful empirical analysis of differences in the “treatment” effect of unions on individual wages by
skill group.  
45
attributes of all jobs were identical and there were no institutional or non-competitive factors causing
wages to deviate from their competitive norm, then all the :i’s would be equal to 1.  But much
evidence suggests that wages for given “quality” workers appear to systematically differ across
industries and employers and by union status suggesting that deviations of :i from 1 are likely to be
quantitatively important.
31   Deviations of wages from “full” competitive compensation whether
arising from compensating differentials for non-wage attributes of employment or from non-
competitive influences on wages are interpreted here as variation in relative rents.
This approach provides a useful framework for examining both changes in relative (log)
wages among labor force groups and changes in residual (within-group) wage inequality.  The
aggregate work force is composed of K demographic groups (typically defined by age, education,
and sex) indexed by k.  The log wage for individual i in group k (Yik ) can be expressed as the sum
of the log competitive wage for i (Yikc) and the log relative rent for i (Rik):
(9) Yik = Yikc + Rik
where Yik = log(wik), Yikc = log(wikc), and Rik = log(:ik).  The mean log wage of group k (the
geometric mean of the wage rate of group-k workers) Yk is conveniently equal to the sum of the
competitive wage for group k (mean log competitive wage of group-k workers) and the average
(log) rents for workers in group k46
(10) Yk = Ykc + Rk. 
  
The competitive (log) relative wages (the Ykc’s) are determined by the interaction of relative supplies
and relative demands for the groups.  To assist in the interpretation of the empirical literature, we
concentrate on relative rents arising from three potentially measurable sources: (1) “true” industry
wage differentials; (2) union wage effects; and (3) impacts of minimum wages or other forms of
direct government intervention in wage setting.  This focus leads us to also classify employment into
J industries indexed by j.
The actual log wage of individual i of group k working in industry j is given by the sum  of
the  competitive log wage for group k (Yk); the mean industry wage differential (conditional on
union status) for workers of group k employed in industry j (Ijk); a union status indicator (Uik = 1 if
i is unionized and 0 otherwise) times the associated mean union wage premium (8k) for group k; a
minimum wage impact status indicator (Mik = 1 if I’s wage is affected by the minimum wage and
0 otherwise) and the associated mean minimum wage impact (*k) for affected workers in group k;
and a (mean zero) individual error term (,ijk) reflecting measurement error and individual-level
(within group) variation in ability and rents:
(11) Yijk = log(wijk) = Ykc + Ijk + 8kUijk +  *kMik + ,ijk .
The industry wage differentials (Ijk’s) potentially reflect differential effects of unions on wage levels
by industry and demographic group (differences in union bargaining power by industry, union threat
effects, and union spillover effects), other sources of non-competitive wage variation across47
industries (efficiency wage and other rent sharing considerations), as well as equalizing differences
for between-industry variation in working conditions and non-wage compensation.  The mean
minimum wage impact (*k) includes direct effects on for those earning the minimum wage as well
as potential positive spillover effects above the minimum wage or possible negative crowding effects
on wages in the uncovered sector.
The mean log wage for group-k workers can be written as:
(12) Yk = Ykc + EjIjkNjk + 8kUk + *kMk
where Njk = Njk/Nk is the share of workers in group k that work in industry j; Uk is the fraction of
group-k workers that are unionized; and Mk is the fraction of group-k workers that are affected by
the minimum wage.  We assume that log wages in each period are measured as deviations from the
overall mean log wage.  The change in the relative log wage of each group k is 
(13) dYk = dYkc + Ej(dIjkNjk + IjkdNjk) + d8kUk + 8kdUk + d*kMk + *kdMk .
The relative wage of a particular group of workers can change either because market forces lead its
mean competitive wage to rise faster or slower than the overall average or because of changes in its
relative rents.  Equation (13) indicates that changes in average relative rents for a group can arise
from changes in the average level or incidence of industry wage premia, changes in the group’s
unionization rate or union wage premium, and changes in the impact of the minimum wage on that
group.   48
Equations (9) to (12) analogously imply that changes in within group wage dispersion can
arise from market forces affecting the distribution of competitive wages within a group (e.g.,
changes in the returns to unmeasured skills) or from institutional factors altering the within group
distribution of rents (e.g., a change in the unionization rate for the group).
The SDI framework can be used to illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of the two
primary empirical approaches to analyzing wage structure changes.  The first approach assumes that
changes in the wage structure largely reflect changes in competitive forces and uses a supply-
demand model to explain actual relative wage and employment changes [e.g., Freeman(1975), Katz
and Murphy (1992), and Murphy and Welch (1992)].  The basic idea is to see how far one can go
with a pure competitive framework.  The remaining “anomalies” can then be examined to determine
the importance of institutional/non-competitive factors. The inherent difficulties in decomposing
changes in within group wage dispersion into changes in prices and quantities means this approach
is typically more straightforward to use in assessing the determinants of between group wage
changes.  The pure supply-and-demand approach can potentially be misleading to the extent
exogenous institutional changes have a substantial effect on observed wages, especially if firms
operate off their labor demand curves.  Furthermore numerous difficult decisions arise concerning
the appropriate level of aggregation of skill groups and strong assumptions are often required to
separate out relative supply and demand shifts and to decompose measured relative demand shifts
into interpretable factors such as the influences of skill-biased technological change, domestic
product market demand shifts, and globalization factors (international trade and outsourcing).  A
more in-depth examination of the issues arising in the implementation of the supply-and-demand
methodology and an assessment of the existing empirical literature using this approach is contained49
in Section 5.  
The second approach more closely follows the framework illustrated in equations (9) to (13)
and tries to directly estimate the separate contributions of changes in institutional factors and
competitive factors to observed changes in group relative wages and/or overall wage dispersion.
The implementation of this approach to between-group wage differences typically uses relative wage
change decomposition similar to equation (13) and involves three steps: (1) estimate the impact of
changes in industry rents, union wage effects, and minimum wage influences on relative wages; (2)
adjust actual wage changes for these institutional influences to uncover changes in relative
competitive wages (the dYkc’s); and (3) use an appropriate supply-demand model to examine the
determinants of these changes in the structure of competitive wages.  Bound and Johnson (1992)
have developed an elegant framework to implement this methodology to account for between-group
wage changes.  Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) have extended this approach to examine
changes in overall, between-group, and within-group wage dispersion; but their specific
implementation limits the influence of supply and demand factors to only affecting between-group
wage changes.
Two key issues arise in the implementation of the more direct SDI approach to sorting out
institutional and competitive influences on the wage structure.  The first is the issue of whether one
can reliably estimate the direct influences of institutional/non-competitive factors on the wage
structure and how these effects change over time.  For example, this approach can generate
misleading inferences of changes the influence of changes in industry rents to the extent estimates
of industry wage differentials partially capture differences in unmeasured worker quality across
industries [Gibbons and Katz (1992); Murphy and Topel (1990)]. And changes in minimum wages32See Fortin and Lemieux (1997) and Lee (1998) for recent attempts at using this approach.
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(real changes or changes relative to the median of the wage distribution) may not imply changes in
the “bite” of the minimum wage if the underlying shadow competitive wages for low-wage workers
are simultaneously changing.  Furthermore estimates of union/nonunion wage differential do not
necessarily capture the full (general equilibrium) impact of unions on the wage structure, they
provide estimates of differences in wages for given worker in union and nonunion setting
conditional on the current locus of unionization.  Thus it is not clear how reliable existing estimates
of union wage effects (or union effects on wage dispersion) are for doing counterfactuals of how the
wage structure would differ if the locus of unionization were different.  The attribution of wage
structure movements to institutional changes may be problematic to the extent evolution of
institutions reflects responses to market forces rather than exogenous events.  A promising approach
is analyze wage structure changes associated with  plausibly exogenous changes in institutions (e.g.,
the differential bite of changes in the Federal minimum wage across U.S. states) or large discrete
changes (e.g., deregulation or privatization of an industry or a major change laws  affecting
unions).
32         
The second related issue concerns the determination of employment when wages deviate
from competitive levels.  Even if one can adjust observed wage changes for institutional effects,
observed employment changes are likely to depend (at least partially) on actual wages rather than
on the latent competitive wages.  Bound and Johnson (1992) attempt to conceptually escape this
problem by assuming employment is set to equate marginal revenue products for each group to the
group’s underlying competitive wage.  This assumption could be justified if deviations from
competitive wages arise from union bargaining power and employers and unions negotiate over51
wages and employment to reach strongly “efficient bargains” (Farber, 1986). But much evidence
suggests that even in union setting employment depends on actual negotiated wages rather than only
on opportunity costs (e.g., Card (1990)) and this assumption is much less plausible for deviations
from competitive wages caused by minimum wages.
Following Bound and Johnson (1991, 1992), we illustrate the operation of the SDI
framework for assessing alternative explanations for between-group wage structure changes using
a simple two group example.  The work force is assumed to consist of two groups (skilled and
unskilled workers).  Data are available on actual log relative wages (log(ws/wu)) and actual log
relative employment (log(Ns/Nu)) for two periods in which the relative wage and employment level
of the more skilled group are both assumed to expand (perhaps representing wage structure and
employment changes for college and non-college workers in the United States during the 1980s).
Figure 6 shows the economy moves from point A to point B.  The question is to what extent does
this observed change in relative wages and employment reflects the operation of competitive forces
as opposed to institutional factors.
The pure supply and demand model assumes relative wages are determined by the
intersection of the relative demand and supply curves in each period.  Under the assumption of
inelastic (predetermined) short-run relative supplies, the increase in the relative employment of
skilled workers reflects a rightward shift in the relative supply of skilled workers in Figure 6.  If
relative demand were stable, the relative wages of skilled workers would have declined.  Thus an
outward shift in the relative demand for skilled workers (from D0 to D1) must have been the driving
force behind the rise in relative wage of skilled workers.  This pattern leads analysts using a supply
and demand model to focus on possible sources of demand shifts for the more-skilled (e.g., skill-52
biased technological change or product demand shifts across sectors with different skill intensities)
and the variation in the rate of growth of relative skill supplies across time periods.
A possible institutional explanation for a rise in the skill differential is a decline in the
relative rents of unskilled workers.  In this case the rise in the relative wage and employment of the
skilled from A to B in Figure 6 could arise even with no shift in the relative demand curve.  For
example, the relative demand curve could be stable at D1, but unskilled workers initially received
large rents from unions with firms setting employment at the competitive level.  In this case, the
economy initially operates off the labor demand curve at point A rather than C.  The increase in  the
relative supply of the skilled would have reduced wages to point D, but the complete erosion of rents
results in the increased skill premium at point B.  
Of course a mixture of both a decline  in relative rents and some shift in relative demand
favoring the skilled could also be consistent with the observed change in relative wages and
employment.   Furthermore, the “naive” supply and demand analysis would correctly estimate the
effects of demand shifts even in the presence of rents as long as wages are set equal to marginal
products.  When employment lies on the labor demand curve, wage changes arising from changes
in rents affect unemployment (or nonemployment rates).  Thus knowledge of the slope of the relative
demand and information on observed changes in relative wages and quantities would allow one to
uncover relative demand shifts, but this approach could attribute wage changes to relative supply
shifts that might reflect changes in relative rents.  Information on changes in population shares or
labor force shares by skill group potentially can be used to supplement relative employment
information to sort out the effects of changes in relative skill supplies from changes in relative rents
[e.g., Jackman, Layard, Manacroda, and Petrongolo (1997); Nickell and Bell (1995)]. 53
5.  Supply and Demand Factors  
This section develops the pure supply and demand approach to analyzing wage structure
changes.  We begin with a generic supply and demand framework to analyze between-group relative
wage changes.  We show how this framework can be used to assess whether observed changes in
relative wages and relative employment are consistent with stable relative factor demands.  We then
examine key modeling issues concerning the specific approach to aggregating heterogeneous
demographic groups into distinct labor inputs (skill groups) and assumptions concerning market
clearing and the exogeneity of relative factor supplies.  The framework is used to examine recent
U.S. wage structure changes.  The importance of between versus within industry demand shifts and
the roles of variation in the rate of growth of relative skill supplies, skill-biased technological
changes, and globalization factors in changes in wage differentials by education are assessed.
5.1 A Simple Supply and Demand Framework 
We begin by examining between-group relative wage changes using a simple supply and
demand framework from Katz and Murphy (1992) in which different demographic groups (identified
by sex, education, and age/experience) are treated as distinct labor inputs.  The relative wages of
demographic groups can be thought of as being generated by the interaction of the relative supplies
of the groups and an aggregate production with its associated factor demand schedules.   The
determinants of relative factor supplies are not specified in the initial framework.  The key
requirement for this approach to be plausible is that observed factor prices and quantities must be
“on the demand curve.”
The basic framework posits an aggregate production function consisting of K types of labor33Katz and Murphy (1992) and Murphy and Welch (1992) provide more detailed discussions of alternative
approaches to measuring relative wages, relative factor supplies, and defining efficiency units.
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inputs.  We assume the associated factor demands can be written as
(14) Nt = D(Wt, Zt)
where
Nt = Kx1 vector of labor inputs employed in the market in year t
Wt = Kx1 vector of market wages for these inputs in year t
Zt = mx1 vector of demand shift variables in year t.
The demand shifters, Zt, capture the effects of technology, product demand shifts, and other non-
labor inputs on demands for labor inputs.  Since we are concerned with explaining relative wage
changes as a function of relative supply and relative demand shifts, we abstract from changes in
absolute wages arising from factor-neutral technological change and from neutral demand shifts
associated with changes in the scale of the economy.  In practice Wt is a vector of relative wages
where actual wages have been deflated by a fixed-weighted wage index capturing aggregate wage
changes, and Nt is a vector of relative supplies measured as a share of total labor input in the
economy in each year measured in efficiency units.  Actual hours worked for each group are
translated into efficiency units by multiplying by the average relative wage for group in some base
period.
33
Under the assumption that the aggregate production function is concave, the (KxK) matrix
of cross-price effects on factor demands, Dw, is negative semidefinite.  Equation (14) can be written
in terms of differentials as55
(15) dNt = DwdWt + DzdZt.
Thus relative wage changes depend on changes in net relative supplies (relative supplies net of
relative demand shifts)
(16) dWt = [Dw]
-1(dNt - DzdZt).
The impact of changes in net relative supplies on relative wages depend on the degree of
substitutability and complementarity among different labor inputs in the aggregate production
function.
The negative semidefiniteness of Dw implies from equation (15) that 
(17) dW' t(dZt - DzdZt) = dW' tDwdWt # 0.
Changes in factor quantities (net of demand shifts) and changes in wages must negatively covary
if observed wages and quantities lie on the factor demand curves.  If factor demand is stable (Zt
fixed), equation (17) implies dW' tdNt # 0.  Actual changes in relative wages and relative quantities
must negatively when factor demands are unchanging.  In the case of two inputs, the intuitive basic
implication of stable relative factor demand is that an increase in the relative supply of a group must
lead to a reduction in the relative wage of that group.  Furthermore data on relative factor quantities
and wages alone can be used to assess whether observed wage structure changes over any period are
consistent with a stable factor demand structure.56
This approach can be illustrated using data on recent U.S. relative wage and supply changes.
Much early work examining U.S. wage structure changes in the 1970s emphasized the role of
“exogenous” relative supply shifts from changing demographics and school completion rates as the
driving force behind relative wage changes [e.g. Freeman (1979), Welch (1979)].  This might appear
to be a reasonable first approach for this period of the labor market entry of the U.S. baby boom
cohorts in which rapid expansions of the relative supply of more-educated and younger workers
coincided with declining narrowing educational wage differentials and expanding experience
differentials.  But an examination of data since the late 1970s or over longer time periods clearly
rejects the assumption of stable factor demands and important role of demand shifts especially
secularly rising relative demand for more-educated workers [e.g., Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998),
Bound and Johnson (1992), Johnson (1997), Katz and Murphy (1992), and Murphy and Welch
(1992)].
Data on relative supply changes for the United States by sex, education, and experience
groups for 1963 to 1987 and several sub-periods from the March CPS are illustrated in Table 11.
These relative supply changes can be compared to the relative wage changes for the same time
periods shown in Table 2.  Since the relative supplies and wages of more educated workers and
females increased over this 25 year period, it is clear that relative demand shifts are necessary to
explain the observed data.  Katz and Murphy (1992) divide the labor force into 64 groups (defined
by sex, education, and experience) and use estimates of the time series (Nt, Wt) covering the 1963
to 1987 period to assess the stable factor demand hypothesis between any given years t and year J
by evaluating whether34Murphy and Welch (1992) present a formal statistical framework for testing the stable factor demand
hypothesis embodied in equation (18) and implement this framework on U.S. data for men for 1963 to 1989.
35But Katz and Murphy (1992) and Murphy and Welch (1992) find that inequality (18) is satisfied for the
1970s.
36The large increases in the educational attainment of the U.S. work-force since 1940 may overstate
increases in the relative supply of "more-skilled" workers to the extent that the "unobserved" quality of more-
educated workers declines with some "re-labeling" of "lower productivity" workers into higher education
categories.  Juhn, Kim, and Vella [1996] examine this issue using Census PUMS data from 1940 to 1990 and
find that conclusions concerning changes in relative supply and implied relative demand shifts are not much
affected by adjustments for such re-labeling through controls for cohort-specific college share or mean years of
education.
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(18) (Wt - WJ)'(Nt - NJ) # 0.  
Time periods for which the inequality in (18) is satisfied (i.e., the inner product of changes in wages
and changes in factor supplies is nonpositive) have the potential to be explained solely by supply
shifts.  When this inequality is not satisfied, no story relying entirely on supply shifts is consistent
with the data.
34  This inequality clearly fails for the entire 1963 to 1987 period as illustrated by the
plot in Figure 7.
35   Demand shifts favoring more-educated workers and women are necessary within
this framework to explain the pattern of relative wage and quantity changes  from 1963 to 1987.
Expanding relative wages of more-skilled workers in the face of increased relative supplies of more-
educated workers are also apparent in many other OECD nations in the 1980s and 1990s [Gottschalk
and Smeeding (1997), OECD(1993, 1996)].
Relative demand shifts favoring more-skilled workers are also essential to understanding
longer-run changes in the U.S. wage structure.  Table 12 displays the evolution of the educational
composition of aggregate U.S. labor input (for those aged 18 to 65 years) measured in full-time
equivalents (total hours worked) and of the log college/high school wage differential from 1940 to
1996.
36  The educational attainment of the work force increased rapidly over this fifty-six year
period with a more than four-fold increase in the share of hours worked by those with at least some37Early papers by Griliches (1970) and Welch (1970) inferred substantial relative demand shifts for the
more-educated in the 1950s and 1960s to explain the failure of the college wage premium to decline in the face of
the rising relative supply of college workers. 
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college.  Despite the large increase in the relative supply of the more educated, the college/high
school wage differential has grown substantially since 1950 suggesting sharp secular growth in the
relative demand for the more educated that started well before the rise in wage inequality of the
1980s.
37   But fluctuations in the rate of growth of the relative supply of more-educated workers also
appear to have played an important role in the time pattern of changes in educational wage
differentials.  Tables 11 and 12 illustrate that an increase in the rate of growth in the supply of
college workers in the 1970s was associated with a decline in the college wage premium and a
decrease in the rate of growth of the supply of college workers in the 1980s was associated with a
sharp rise in the college wage premium.  A rather smooth trend increase in the relative demand for
more-educated workers combined with observed fluctuations in the rate of growth of the relative
supply has the potential to explain much of the evolution of U.S. educational wage differentials at
least over the past few decades.
The consistency of alternative hypotheses (alternative choices of demand shifters Zt)
concerning the evolution of relative demand with the observed pattern of changes in relative wages
and supplies from J to t can be assessed using a discrete version of equation (17)
(19) (Wt - WJ)'[(Nt - NJ) - (D(WJ,Zt) - D(WJ,ZJ))] # 0,
which involves evaluating the value of the inner product of the change in wages from year J to year
t with the changes in net supplies (equal to the actual change in relative factor supplies less the59
change in relative demands that would have happened at fixed factor prices).  A particular
hypothesis of interest is whether that data are consistent with a stable trend rate of demand change
for each labor force group with fluctuations in relative wages about trend driven by detrended
relative supply changes.  Such trend demand shifts might reflect a rather steady pace of non-neutral
technological change or steady shifts in the industrial composition of employment.  Katz and
Murphy (1992) and Murphy and Welch (1992) find for U.S. data that allowing for trend demand
shifts virtually eliminates inconsistencies with otherwise stable demand for the overall period from
the early 1960s to the late 1980s, but Katz and Murphy conclude that some acceleration of demand
shifts favoring the more-educated and women in the 1980s is required to explain difference among
sub-periods in the pattern of relative wage and employment changes.  
Analyses of U.S. changes in relative wages and factor supplies over recent decades using a
simple supply and demand framework indicate a key role for strong secular shifts in the relative
demand favoring the more skilled and decade-to-decade fluctuations in the pace of relative supply
changes.  An assessment of the quantitative importance for explaining relative wage movements of
relative supply and demand shifts and of the underlying sources of the demand shifts requires adding
more structure to the framework. 
5.2 Some Issues in Supply and Demand Analysis
The assessment of whether economy-wide changes in relative wages and quantities
employed are consistent with stable factor demand requires that aggregate factor demand equations
(as in equation (14)) satisfy the usual properties of factor demands and that actual wages and38Thus such assessments may be inaccurate if relative wage changes are driven by institutional factors that
force firms off their labor demand curves.
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employment levels lie on these factor demand equations.
38  No assumptions about the determinants
of relative factor supplies are necessary.  
Further progress on the contribution of different supply and demand factors to wage structure
changes requires additional assumptions about the determinants of  factor supplies and the functional
form of the factor demand equations.  Two key assumptions typically made are that of full-
employment (relative wages adjust so that relative supplies equal relative demands) and exogenous
(or at least pre-determined) relative supplies.  Relative supplies are treated as pre-determined by past
educational investment decisions and demographic changes arising from earlier fertility and
immigration decisions.  Current labor force participation decisions are assumed to be unaffected by
current market conditions.  Thus the basic model is one of a vertical (inelastic) short-run relative
labor supply curve as in Figure 6.  Relative quantities employed are determined by pre-determined
relative supplies, while both relative demand and supply factor affect relative wages.  
The full employment/market clearing assumption may be reasonable for the United States,
but it is clearly is problematic for examining European economies over the past two decades.
Jackman, Layard, Manacorda, and Petrongolo (1997) have extended the basic model to allow for
bargaining factors unemployment under the assumption that relative supply shifts can be measured
by exogenous changes in relative labor force sizes by skill group. The well-documented decline in
the relative employment/population ratios (through both rising relative unemployment rates and
declining relative labor force participation rates) of groups with declining wages in the United States
since the 1970s [e.g., Murphy and Topel (1997), Murphy and Welch (1997)] further suggests the
assumption of exogenous inelastic relative labor supply curves may also be problematic the United39Hamermesh (1993) provides a detailed and thoughtful discussion of the issues arising in the choice of an
aggregation scheme in empirical work on labor demand.
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States.  Relative population shares of different groups  can potentially be used to instrument for
relative employment shares to allow for an elastic short run supply curves if relative population
shares by sex-education-age groups can plausibly be viewed as pre-determined.         
Two other key decisions required to implement a supply and demand analysis are an assumed
functional form of the factor demand schedules and a choice concerning how to disaggregate labor
input into different skill groups.  These decisions involve (explicit or implicit) assumptions about
the nature of the aggregate production function.  
Many alternative approaches to the aggregation of heterogeneous labor force groups into
“appropriate” skill groups have been used in recent research on wage structure changes.
39  One
would like to aggregate workers into groups such that workers are much closer substitutes in
production within the groups than between the groups.  The implicit assumption is that hours of
work by different workers are perfect substitutes within a skill group.  But the hours of different
workers can easily be given different weights in adding up the total supply within a group such as
through the approach of measuring labor supplies in efficiency units with each worker’s hours
weighted by the average wage in a base period of that worker’s more detailed sub-group.
A fruitful first- cut approach that is easy to implement is to break up the work force into two
groups along the wage structure dimension of particular interest: high-education and low-education
to examine educational wage differentials, “young” and “old” to study experience differentials, and
men and women to examine gender differentials.  The groups can typically be chosen so that the
assumption of much greater substitutability within than between groups is plausible and estimates
using such an approach are easy to interpret.  The disadvantage is one loses much information about62
the subtleties of wage structure changes from this extreme approach to aggregation.  Examples of
this approach include the analyses of relative wage changes for two education groups,  skilled
(college or more) and unskilled (less than college) by Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), Baldwin and
Cain (1997) and Krussell et al. (1997).  Much research has also analyzed wage structure and relative
demand changes for two broad occupation groups such as production and nonproduction workers
[e.g., Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994); Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998)].  Such a broad
occupational breakdown is often all that is available for many data sets derived from establishment-
based surveys  such as the U.S. Annual Survey of Manufactures or cross-country data for
manufacturing industries from the U.N. General Industrial Statistics Database.  The assumption of
pre-determined relative supplies is clearly much less plausible for an occupational grouping than for
education or  age groupings.  But Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) and Machin and Van Reenan
(1997) find that a nonproduction/production worker approach does a reasonable job of matching a
high/low education group breakdown in manufacturing for most advanced industrial nations.   
A hybrid of the two-group approach is to examine the relative wage of two “pure” skill
classes (college graduates and high school graduates) and to relate this relative wage to changes in
the relative supply and demands for “equivalents” of these pure skill classes (college and high
school equivalents).  The aggregation of multiple skill groups into two pure skill classes follows the
“linear synthesis” approach developed by Welch (1969) by assuming each skill group is a linear
combination of the two pure skill classes with the weights usually based on the extent to which
wages of each group tracks those of the pure skill groups [e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992)].  
The alternative approach is to specify labor input as consisting of a large number of possible
inputs typically defined by sex, education, age/experience groups or with even further differentiation40Card (1997) similarly uses a CES production function with ten skill deciles as the distinct inputs.
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by race and foreign born status.  The advantage of this approach is the ability to gain much more
information about the nature of wage structure changes (e.g., differences in changes in educational
wage differentials for older and younger workers, etc.). But strong assumptions about functional
forms and substitution possibilities between groups must be imposed to make this approach feasible.
Restrictions on substitution possibilities reduce the number of parameters to be estimated in the
factor demand system to a practical number.  A breakdown of the work force into K groups implies
the matrix of cross-price elasticities among the groups (Dw in equation (15)) as well as the related
substitution matrix ([Dw]
-1 ) both contain KxK elements implying an enormous number of separate
parameters for large K even after  imposing symmetry if one does not make further restrictions.  The
estimation of this many separate parameters for large K is unlikely to be feasible and will more than
exhaust the available degrees of freedom when the number of groups is large relative to the time
periods or the cross-section units (different regions) being used as the source of identifying
variation.  For example, Bound and Johnson (1992) examine 32 demographic groups using data from
3 years and Murphy and Welch (1992) examine 188 groups over 27 years.
The first method to addressing this problem is to assume a particular functional form for the
production function to limit the number of substitution parameters.  Bound and Johnson (1991,
1992) assume a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function with each of 32
demographic groups as the inputs and thereby estimate a single intrafactor substitution parameter.
40
The key assumption underlying this approach is that the degree of substitutability in production of
between any pair of groups is the same.  Thus the degree of substitutability between young male
high school graduates and high school dropouts is assumed to be equivalent to the degree of41Teulings (1997) develops an alternative approach to aggregation allowing for an infinite number of skill
classes but adding structure based on an assumption of the comparative advantage of more skilled workers in more
complex jobs.
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substitutability between young male high school dropout and experienced female college graduates.
This assumption seems implausible given the similar occupational and industrial distributions of
young male high school graduates and dropouts and the quite dissimilar occupational and industrial
distributions of young male dropouts and experienced female college graduates (Murphy and Welch
(1997)).  But Bound and Johnson (1992) show a major advantage of the CES approach is that it can
be applied at the sectoral level and provides an interpretable structural framework to analyze
between- and within-industry demand shifts for multiple skill groups. 
A second method is to aggregate the number of groups to a smaller feasible number to allow
more general patterns of substitution among the groups (such as the three group approach of Jaeger
(1995)).  The third method is to assume that wages for individual workers depend on their quantities
of a smaller number, k<K,  of (latent) basic skills.  The endowments of each of the k underlying
skills for K groups vary at a point of time but are assumed to be stable over time.  Murphy and
Welch (1992) show how this approach greatly reduces the number of parameters to be estimated in
the factor demand structure for small k and still allows a rich pattern of substitution possibilities
among the K groups.
41
5.3 Supply and Demand Analysis of Changes in Educational Wage Differentials
Many studies (at least since Freeman (1975)) have used simple supply and demand
frameworks to analyze changes in educational wage differentials in the United States and other42Empirical analyses of more general supply-and-demand frameworks to assess a range of wage structure
changes (e.g., education, experience, and gender differentials) include Katz and Murphy (1992) and Murphy and
Welch (1992).  
43Goldin and Katz (1998) model and document this process of upskilling from less-skilled to more-skilled
production workers and from production to non-production workers in the U.S. manufacturing sector with the spread
of electricity and adoption of continuous process and batch production methods from 1890 to 1929.  
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countries.  A common approach is to break the work force into two broad educational groups.
42  We
illustrate this approach by considering a CES production function for aggregate output Q with two
factors, college equivalents (c) and high school equivalents (h):
(20) Qt = ["t(atNct)
D + (1-"t)(btNht)
D]
1/D
where Nct and Nht are the quantities employed of college equivalents (skilled labor) and high-school
equivalents (unskilled labor) in period t, at and bt represent skilled and unskilled labor augmenting
technological change, "t is a time-varying technology parameter that can be interpreted as
indexing the share of work activities allocated to skilled labor, and D is a time invariant
production parameter.
Skill-neutral technological improvements raise at and bt by the same proportion.  Skill-
biased technological changes involve increases in at/bt or "t.  Following Johnson and Stafford
(1998a),  one can interpret increases in at/bt as intensive skill-biased technological change in which
skilled workers get relatively better at their existing jobs more rapidly than do unskilled workers.
Increases in "t can be viewed as extensive skill biased technological change or “upskilling” that
shifts work tasks from unskilled to skilled workers.
43  The aggregate elasticity of substitution
between college and high-school equivalents is given by F = 1/(1-D).
Although the single-sector, aggregate production function directly including only labor66
inputs given in equation (20) is a well-defined analytical construct, one must be clear about what
it means.  Such an aggregate production function does not necessarily have any simple interpretation
in terms of the production functions of individual firms or even industry-level production functions.
The aggregate elasticity of substitution F reflects not only technical substitution possibilities in firm-
level production functions but also outsourcing possibilities and  substitution possibilities across
goods and services in consumption.  Changes in the “technology” indicators at/bt and "t represent
not only true technological changes at the firm level but also the non-neutral effects on skill groups
of changes the relative prices or quantities of non-labor inputs (capital, energy) and shifts in product
demand among industries with different skill intensities.
Under the assumption that college and high-school equivalents are paid their marginal
products, we can use equation (20) to solve for the ratio of marginal products of the two labor types
yielding a relationship between relative wages in year t, wct/wht, and relative supplies in year t,
Nct/Nht given by
(21) log(wct/wht) = log("t/[1-"t]) + Dlog(at/bt) - (1/F)log(Nct/Nht),
which can be rewritten as
(22) log(wct/wht) =(1/F)[Dt - log(Nct/Nht)],
where Dt indexes relative demand shifts favoring college equivalents and is measured in log quantity
units.  The impact of changes in relative skill supplies on relative wages depends inversely on the44Thus this simple framework is potentially consistent with capital-skill complementarity.  In this case,
changes in the relative price (or supply of capital) imply shifts in Dt.  For example, the nested CES aggregate
production function explicitly allowing for capital-skill complementarity of Krusell et al. (1997) yields a relative
wage determination equation that can be written in the same basic form as equation (22).
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magnitude of aggregate elasticity of substitution between the two skill groups.  The greater is F, the
smaller the impact of shifts in relative supplies on relative wages and the greater must be
fluctuations in demand shifts (Dt ) to explain any given time series of relative wages for a given time
series of relative quantities.   Changes in Dt can arise from (disembodied) skill-biased technological
change, non-neutral changes in the relative prices or quantities of nonlabor inputs such as computer
services, increased outsourcing possibilities that disproportionately affect the two skill groups, and
shifts in product demand either from domestic or international sources.
44     
Two approaches can be taken using this framework to assess alternative stories for relative
wage changes by skill group consistent with the observed pattern of changes in relative wages and
quantities employed.  The first is to directly estimate equation (22) after substituting for the
unobserved time series Dt with functions of time (e.g., a linear time trend) and/or observable proxies
for relative skill demand shifts (such as an index of between-industry demand shifts, cyclical
indicators, or measures of international trade).  This procedure typically involves OLS estimation
of equation (22) using national time series data under the assumption that relative skill quantities
employed are pre-determined and yields direct estimates of F and of the impact of observable
demand shifters [e.g., Freeman (1975, 1978), Katz and Revenga (1989)].  The same basic approach
can be implemented on panel data on wage structure changes by regions [Juhn (1994), Topel (1993)]
or countries.  The strong assumption of exogenous relative supply shifts and standard problems of
estimation from time series samples with nonindependent observations should introduce a note of
caution in interpreting such estimates.68
Katz and Murphy (1992) implement this approach to explain changes in the U.S.
college/high school wage differential from 1963 to 1987.  The precise relative wage measure used
is the ratio of (fixed-weighted) average wages of those with at least a college degree (16 or more
years of schooling) relative to those with exactly a high school degrees (12 years of schooling).
Katz and Murphy begin with 320 skill groups (defined by sex, education, and experience) and
amalgamate them into two labor aggregates: college and high-school equivalents.  The basic
movements of  these relative wage and quantity measures are summarized in Table 13 and the basic
pattern of a moderate increase in the college wage premium in the 1960s, a decline in the 1970s, and
a sharp increase in the 1980s is apparent in this data.  Katz and Murphy assume Dt can be
approximated by a simple linear time trend and estimate equation (22)  over the 1963-87 period by
OLS yielding
(23) log(wct/wht) = -0.709 log(Nct/Nht) +  0.033 time + constant, R
2=0.52,
         (0.150)         (0.007)
where the numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  
The actual time series of college returns and fitted values from the regression are displayed
in Figure 8.  The model does a reasonable job of explaining movements in the college wage
premium over this period but misses the depth of the decline from the mid to late 1970s.  The
implied estimate of F, the elasticity of substitution between college and high school labor, from
equation (23) is 1.41. The time trend coefficient multiplied by the implied estimate of F  indicates
a secular shift in relative demand favoring college workers of approximately 4.6 log points a year
over this period in comparison to relative supply growth of 3.9 log points year.  The model implies45Historical evidence is also consistent with substantial effects of changes in relative skill supplies on
relative wages.  For example, Goldin and Katz (1995) find that the rapid expansion in secondary schooling during
the “high school movement” in the United States from 1910 to 1940 was associated with a substantial narrowing of
the relative earnings of white collar workers.
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that strong secular relative demand growth for college graduates is necessary to explain  the overall
rise in the college wage premium in the face of rapid relative supply growth from 1963 to 1987.  But
fluctuations in the rate of growth of the relative supply of college equivalents helps explain large
differences across decades in the behavior of the college wage premium.  The log college wage
premium decreased by 1.3 log points annually from 1971 to 1979 and then increased by 1.6 log
points annually from 1979 to 1987.  The  estimated model implies that almost half (1.36 log points
per year) of the 2.9 log points per year difference in the increase in the log college wage premium
in the 1980s from the 1970s is explained by a slowdown in relative supply growth with remaining
1.54 log points being accounted for by unmeasured (residual) increases in relative demand growth.
The limited time series evidence of estimates of equations of the form of equation (22)
indicates negative effects of increases in the national relative supply of the more educated on
educational wage differentials in other countries including Canada [Freeman and Needels (1993),
Murphy, Riddell, and Romer (1998)], Britain [Schmitt, 1995], Sweden [Edin and Holmlund (1995)],
the Netherlands  [Teulings (1992)], and South Korea [Kim and Topel (1995)].   The estimates
suggest (conditional on proxies for demand shifts) that a 10 percent increase in the relative supply
of more-educated workers lowers their relative pay 3 to 7 percent in various countries implying
aggregate elasticities of substitution in the 1 to 3 range.  These findings are consistent with declining
educational wage differentials throughout the OECD in the 1970s in the face of rapid supply growth
of college graduates.
45  Countries that experienced at least modest increases in educational wage
differentials in the 1980s — especially the United States and United Kingdom — tended to70
experience a decline in the rate of growth of the supply of college workers in the 1980s.  Countries
whose educational differentials did not expand in the 1980s — France, Germany, and the
Netherlands — essentially maintained their 1970s rate of growth of supply of more-educated
workers into the 1980s [Freeman and Katz (1994), OECD (1993)].  Freeman and Needles (1993)
and Murphy, Riddell, and Romer (1998) also find that the continued rapid expansion of the relative
supply of college equivalents in Canada helps explain the much more modest increase in skill
differentials in Canada than in the United States during the 1980s.  
A controversial issue concerns the relevant relative supply measure when applying the
supply and demand framework embodied in equation (22) in an open economy setting.  The
integrated equilibrium with incomplete specialization of a standard Hecksher-Olin trade model
implies that national relative factor supplies only impact relative wage by changing world relative
supplies [e.g., Leamer (1996), Johnson and Stafford (1998b)].  This essentially implies a horizontal
relative demand curve at the national level.  Single country time-series negative relationships
between (detrended) national relative skill supply increases seem inconsistent with this prediction.
This could arise if national relative supply changes are highly correlated among internationally
integrated advanced economies [Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998)].  But differences across
countries in (detrended) relative supply growth also appear to be associated with differences in
relative wage behavior even in such tightly linked economies as Canada and the United States.
These findings suggests a focus on shifts in relative skill supplies and demand at national level may
not be inappropriate.  Changes in relative skill supplies in other countries may affect the price of
traded goods and show up as a shift in Dt in equation (22).  Johnson and Stafford (1998b) provide
a comprehensive discussion of deviations from the standard Hecksher-Olin model (such as71
differentiated products with some home bias in consumption demand and imperfect domestic factor
mobility) which lead to a national relative wage determination equation consistent with this
(implicitly) closed economy framework.
The second approach to assessing supply and demand stories for changes in the college wage
premium is to use outside information to choose a value of F and then use equation (22) and data
on the time series of relative wages and quantities to impute the time series of  Dt conditional on the
assumed value of F [Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), Johnson (1997), Katz and Murphy (1992),
Murphy, Riddell, and Romer (1998)].   An advantage of this approach (conditional on knowledge
of reasonable values for F) is that one can draw inferences about the path of Dt  without assuming
full employment or the exogeneity of relative supply changes.  One can also examine the sensitivity
of different stories to “reasonable” choices for F and determine whether the implied time series for
Dt matches well with possible observable measures of demand shifts.  Solving equation (22) for Dt
and rearranging terms yields
(24) Dt = log(wctNct/whtNht) + (F-1)log(wct/wht).
Changes in the log relative demand for college equivalents equals the sum of the change in the log
relative wage bill and a term that depends positively (negatively) on the change in the log college
wage premium when F>1 (F<1).  If F=1 (the Cobb-Douglas case), then changes in the relative
demand for college equivalents are directly given by changes in the relative wage bill.
This approach requires some knowledge of a plausible range for the elasticity of substitution
between high- and low-education workers.  The  estimate of F=1.41 from (23) is in the middle of46Furthermore there is little reason to expect technological changes to leave F relatively constant and
increased openness is likely to imply greater substitutability of domestic and foreign labor and an implied increase in
F.  But little direct evidence is available on changes in the aggregate elasticity of substitution.
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the range of 0.5 to 2.5 in earlier studies using cross-sectional approaches reviewed by Freeman
(1986).  Time series studies for different countries suggest a similar range.  In an important early
study, Johnson (1970) uses cross-state data for 1960 yielding estimates of the elasticity of
substitution of college and high school labor of close to 1.5.  Krusell et al. (1997) have extended the
Katz-Murphy model of equation (23) through 1991 (using a slightly different aggregation scheme
into college and high school workers) and find a similar implied estimate of F of approximately 1.3.
Krusell et al. generate a modestly higher estimate of F=1.67 from a more structural model directly
allowing for capital-skill complementarity and replacing the linear time trend proxy for Dt with a
measure of the relative supply of capital equipment.  Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) develop
a distinctive approach to measuring relative skill prices and quantities for two skill groups that
allows for movements in wages to deviate from movements in skill prices because of changes in
amount of earnings potential devoted to on-the-job training.  Heckman, Lochner, and Taber estimate
the elasticity of substitution between high and low skill labor to be 1.44 applying OLS to (22) for
March CPS data from 1965 to 1990 and find quite similar estimates of F when instrumenting for
relative employment shares with cohort size.   In summary much recent evidence suggests the
elasticity of substitution between college and non-college workers in the United States is close to
1.4, but a substantial range of uncertainty remains.
46      
Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) assess alternative explanations for changes in the U.S.
college wage premium from 1940 to 1996 under different assumptions about F.  Autor, Katz and
Krueger divide the work force into two groups: college equivalents (college graduates plus half of47Johnson (1997) defines college equivalents in the same manner.  The findings are quite similar when the
more formal approach of Katz and Murphy (1992) is used to allocate different education groups to college and high
school equivalents, or when a classification of workers into college graduates and those without college degrees (less
than 16 years of completed schooling) is used.
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those with some college) and high school equivalents (half of those with some college plus workers
with 12 or fewer years of schooling).
47  Panel A of Table 14 shows decadal changes in the log
college/high wage differential and the log relative wage bill and supply of college equivalents.  The
total wage bills for college equivalents and high school equivalents can be directly calculated from
household data on employment and earnings and the college/high school wage premium is estimated
in each year from a standard human capital log earnings equation with individual year of schooling
dummies.  The (composition-adjusted) log relative supply change is calculated simply as the change
in log relative wage bill minus the change in the (regression-adjusted) log relative wage: log(Nct/Nht)
= log([wctNct/whtNht]) - log(wct/wht).  The 1970s is clearly the outlier decade in terms of the rapid
relative supply growth of college graduates associated with the labor market entry of the baby boom
cohorts and possible effects of incentives for college enrollment from the Vietnam War. 
The sensitivity of conclusions concerning the implied time path of the growth of relative
demand for college workers from (24) under different assumptions about the magnitude of F is
illustrated in panel B of Table 14.  The base case assumption of F=1.4 implies the sharp difference
in the behavior of the college wage in the 1970s and the 1980s can be attributed both to slower
relative supply growth and faster relative demand growth.  An acceleration in relative demand
growth is necessary to explain the sharp rise in the college wage premium in the 1980s for estimates
of F in the range of most recent estimates from 1 to 2.  A marked decrease in the rate of growth of
relative demand is apparent in the 1990s.  The compression of educational wage differentials in the
1940s is attributed to slow (and possibly negative) relative demand growth for college workers.74
Goldin and Margo (1992) find particularly strong demand growth for unskilled labor during the
1940s, but they also conclude that wage compression in the 1940s was at least partially driven by
institutional factors including direct government intervention in wage setting during World War II,
the rapid expansion of unions, and possible changes in previous customary wage setting norms.  
Overall Table 14  indicates rapid growth in the relative demand for college graduates since
1950 is necessary to reconcile the large increase in the U.S. college wage premium in the face of
continuing relative supply increases.  Relative supply and demand fluctuations appear to play roles
in decadal variations in the change in the college wage premium.  The hypothesis of an acceleration
in relative demand growth in the 1980s possibly from the computer revolution or globalization
factors is supported assuming F is in the range of recent estimates of 1.3 to 1.7.  But the slowdown
in demand growth in the 1990s is surprising from this perspective given the continuing spread of
computers and  more rapid growth of U.S. trade with less-developed countries in the first half of the
1990s than in the 1980s [Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997)].  Splitting the full time period roughly
in half into the 1940-70 and 1970-96 sub-periods, there is a faster rate in the rate of relative demand
growth the second half of the sample suggestive of hypotheses of an increased rate of skill-biased
technological change starting in the 1970s [Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997)].  But evidence of
a  discrete trend break in the 1970s is not very strong.  
These findings  indicate the importance of assessing potential sources of trend growth in
favor of more-educated workers (such as skill-biased technological changes, capital-skill
complementarity, and steady increases in globalization) as well as sources of variation in the rate
of demand shifts across periods and the sources of variation in the rate of supply growth (e.g., cohort
size, access to higher education, immigration). 75
5.4 Between- and Within-Industry Shifts in Relative Demand
From the late 1970s to the mid-1990s groups of workers (defined by education and other
measures of skill and by sex) with rising relative wages have also tended to have rising relative
supplies in most advanced nations [Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998); Katz, Loveman and
Blanchflower (1995)].  This pattern is suggestive of pronounced demand shifts favoring the more
educated over the less educated and women over men.  Substantial shifts in relative demand favoring
more-educated workers appear necessary to explain wage structure changes in the United States and
other OECD nations both over recent decades and probably over the past century [e.g., Gottschalk
and Smeeding (1997); Tinbergen (1974, 1975)]. 
Changes in product demand (“deindustrialization”),  globalization factors, and skill-biased
technological change have attracted much attention as possible sources for shifts in relative labor
demand.  A common approach is to conceptualize relative demand shifts as coming from two types
of changes: those that occur within industries (i.e., shifts that change the relative factor intensities
within industries at fixed relative wages) and those that occur between industries (i.e., shifts that
change the allocation of total labor between industries at fixed relative wages).  Sources of within-
industry shifts include pure skill-biased technological change, changes in the relative prices (or
supplies) of non-labor inputs (e.g., computer services or new capital equipment), and changes in
outsourcing activity.   Between-industry shifts in relative labor demand may be generated by sectoral
differences in productivity growth and by shifts in product demand across industries arising either
from domestic sources or from shifts in net international trade which change the domestic share of
output in an industry at fixed wages.    
   This conceptualization has led to the use of decompositions of aggregate changes in the76
utilization of more-skilled labor into between-industry and within-industry components as a  guide
to the importance of product demand shifts as opposed to skill-biased technological change (or
outsourcing) as sources of relative demand changes [e.g., Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), Berman,
Bound, and Griliches (1994), Murphy and Welch (1993b)].  Even the most detailed industry
classifications available in the standard household and establishment surveys used in such analysis
represent aggregate of multiple product markets.  Thus, in practice, measured within-industry shifts
in labor demand may contain the effects of product demand shifts within the available industry
categories.  This concern has motivated the use of establishment-level data to decompose changes
in the overall employment share (or labor cost share) of more-skilled labor into between- and within-
establishment components [e.g., Bernard and Jensen (1997); Dunne, Haltwanger, and Troske
(1996)].  Of course, product demand shifts could potentially lead to shifts in product mix, changes
in production technology, and changes in the organization of work and relative skill demands at the
establishment level.  Such decompositions alone clearly can’t separate out the exogenous forces
driving changes in skill utilization at the plant level.  These analyses should be supplemented with
case studies and with attempts to examine the correlates of differences across industries and plants
of the rate of skill upgrading.
The effect of between-sector shifts in labor demand on the relative demand for different
demographic (or skill) groups depends on group differences in industrial employment distributions.
Shifts in employment demand between industries with have a larger effect on the relative demands
for different labor inputs the greater are the differences in factor ratios (skill intensities) across
industries.  There exist substantial differences across industries in all advanced nations in
employment distributions of different education groups and of men versus women.  Changes in the77
industrial distribution of employment (measured in efficiency units) and variation in the utilization
of highly educated (college) labor  across broad U.S. industries from 1968 to 1988 are illustrated in
Table 15, which uses the college-equivalents aggregation approach of Murphy and Welch (1993b).
The table illustrates large shifts in the industrial employment distribution from 1968 to 1988
out of manufacturing sectors (especially low-skill and medium-skill manufacturing) and into
professional services and finance, trade, and education and welfare services.  Longer-term shifts in
the industrial distribution of employment from 1940 to 1990 also show large shifts towards the more
highly-educated sectors [e.g., Juhn (1994)].  Industrial employment shifts since 1960 have favored
industries that more intensively utilize college graduates relative to less-educated workers and
women relative to men.  The industries most intensive in less educated males have seen the largest
decline.  These patterns are reinforced when one considers occupational shifts as well industrial
shifts [Katz and Murphy (1992); Murphy and Welch (1993a)].      
If within-industry relative factor demand is stable so that changes in the wage structure are
entirely explained by between-industry shifts in labor demand and relative supply changes, then the
shares of industrial employment of groups whose relative wages have increased should tend to fall
inside every industry.  Thus the hypothesis of stable within-industry demand implies that the share
of college equivalents should have declined in all U.S. industries over the past few decades. In fact,
Table 15 illustrates strong within-sector upgrading occurred from 1968 to 1988 with the share of
college equivalents increasing in every broad industry.  Similar patterns of substantial skill
upgrading are observed in the examination of changes in labor utilization within more disaggregate
industries [Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994), Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998)] and at the
establishment level [Bernard and Jensen (1997); Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997);  Dunne,48Berman, Bound and Machin (1998) document a similar pattern of within-industry skill upgrading (shifts to
nonproduction workers) in the manufacturing sectors of all advanced countries in the 1970s and 1980s even during
period of sharply rising relative wages for more-skilled workers.
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Haltiwanger, and Troske (1996)].
48  This finding indicates that within-industry demand shifts
favoring these groups must have occurred.  On the other hand, the finding does not rule out the
possibility that the between-industry shifts have also played a significant role in relative wage
changes.  But Murphy and Welch (1993) and Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) find that the vast
majority of the increased utilization (measured by employment or labor cost) of college graduates
in recent decades can be accounted for by within-industry changes.  And Dunne, Haltiwanger, and
Troske (1996) find with plant-level data for manufacturing that aggregate changes in skilled labor
employment and labor cost share are dominated by within-plant changes.
How does one quantitatively assess the contributions of different sources of relative labor
demand shifts?  This is a difficult issue often requiring strong assumptions about sectoral production
functions and the consumer preferences [Bound and Johnson (1992)].  One widely used measure of
the effect of between-sector demand shifts on relative labor demands is the fixed-coefficient input
requirements index introduced by Freeman (1975).  This index measures the percentage change in
the demand for a demographic group as the weighted average of percentage employment growth by
industry where the weights are the industrial employment distribution for the demographic group
in a base period.  This proxy for the percentage change in demand for demographic group k can be
written as 
(25) )DEMk = Ej 8jk()Ej/Ej) 79
where j indexes industry, Ej is total employment in industry j, 8jk = Ejk/(EjEjk) in a base year, and Ejk
is the employment of group k in industry j.  Katz and Murphy (1992) provide a formal justification
for )DEMk as a between-industry demand shift index when employment is measured in efficiency
units (value-weighted labor inputs), when industry technologies are held fixed except for factor-
neutral technological change, and when relative wages are unchanging.  Since changes in relative
wages can directly affect the distribution of industrial outputs (and employments), )DEMk will not
measure the effects on relative labor demand of changes in the allocation of employment across
sectors at fixed wages when relative wages are changing.  These demand shifts indices will tend to
understate the “true” between-industry demand shift favoring groups with rising relative wages and
overstate demand shifts for groups with falling relative wages [Katz and Murphy (1992)].  Murphy
and Welch (1993a) and Juhn (1994) propose and implement adjustments for this bias under the
strong assumption of unit own-price and zero cross-price elasticities of consumer demand.   
Empirical analyses of the magnitude of between-industry and between-occupation shifts in
relative labor demand using (adjusted and unadjusted) versions of )DEMk indicate strong and rather
steady between-industry and between-occupation demand shifts favoring more-educated workers
and  high-wage workers from 1950 to the present [Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993); Juhn (1994);
Katz and Murphy (1992); Murphy and Welch (1993a)].   Between-industry demand shifts actually
appear to be larger in magnitude in the 1960s, a period of the rapid expansion of employment in
government and education-intensive service sectors, than in the period since 1970 [Katz and Murphy
(1992); Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998)].  The direction of demand shifts in the 1940s are less clear
[e.g., Goldin and Margo (1992)].  But the magnitudes of measured demand shifts for more-educated
labor between industries or between occupations are consistently much smaller than the growth of49An alternative possibility for large within-industry (and within-plant) shifts in relative labor demand
favoring skilled workers is increased foreign outsourcing of less-skilled jobs [Feenstra and Hanson (1996)]. 
Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994) and Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998) conclude that (at least through the
1980s) the amount of such foreign outsourcing is too small for it to be the driving force behind within-industry skill
upgrading.
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the relative supply of more-educated workers [Katz and Murphy (1992); Murphy and Welch
(1993a)].  Thus substantial within-industry and within-occupation demand shifts favoring the more-
skilled are a key driving force in the large secular increase in the relative demand for more-educated
workers documented in Table 14.  Similar patterns are apparent in other OECD countries [e.g., Katz,
Loveman, and Blanchflower (1995)].  These patterns are strongly suggestive of an important role
of skill-biased technological change.
49
When within-sector factor-biased technological changes are allowed, the interpretation of
)DEMk as a measure of the impact of product demand shifts on relative labor demand becomes
more tenuous and the nature of the bias is more complicated [Bound and Johnson (1992)].  In this
case, one needs to add more structure (i.e., assumptions concerning sectoral production functions
and consumer preferences) to develop measures of the contribution of product demand shifts and
skill-biased technological change as sources of changes in relative labor demand.  We illustrate these
issues using a simplified version of the model developed by Bound and Johnson (1992) with two
inputs college equivalents (c) and high school equivalents (h).  Under the rather strong assumptions
of Cobb-Douglas industry production functions and Cobb-Douglas consumer preferences, we find
that a standard shift-share decomposition of the growth of the aggregate college wage-bill share
(share of college equivalents in total costs) can be used to directly measure the extent to which the
growth in the relative demand for college equivalents reflects skill-biased technological change as
opposed to product demand shifts.81
Following Bound and Johnson [1992], we assume the economy consists of J industries and
the output of each industry j (Qj) depends on the employment of college and high school equivalents
according to a CES production function of the form of equation (20) with a common elasticity of
substitution (F = 1/[1-D]) and with the other technology parameters ("jt, ajt, and bjt) allowed to vary
by industry and time.  The relative demand for the output of industry j relative to a reference
industry r in period t is assumed to be given by
(26) Qjt/Qjt  =  2jt(Pjt)
-,
where Pkt is the price of Qkt relative to Qrt and 2kt is a parameter that reflects consumer tastes and
other factors (such a foreign competition) affecting relative product demand for the output of
industry k in year t.  
We consider the special case of a Cobb-Douglas economy: F = , = 1.  The production
function  for industry j can now be written as:
where Ajt indexes the level of productivity in industry j in year t.   We assume the aggregate labor
supplies of college equivalents (Nct) and of  high school equivalents (Nht) are exogenous and full
employment prevails so that  the entire labor force of each group is allocated across the J industries:
Nct = Ej Ncjt and Nht = Ej Nhjt.  Workers are assumed to be mobile across industries so that wages are
equalized across industries.  These assumptions imply (using equation (A8) of Bound and Johnson50The common industry-level elasticity of substitution and the aggregate elasticity of substitution are only
equal when F = , or all industries have the same factor intensities or both.
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(1992)) that the log ratio of the competitive wage for college equivalents to that of high school
equivalents is given by
Equation (28) is of the same form as equation (22) with an aggregate elasticity of substitution
between college and high school equivalents of 1 and with the demand shift term Dt now directly
related to industry technology and product demand shift parameters.
50 
Under these Cobb-Douglas assumptions the aggregate log relative demand for college
equivalents (Dt) can be decomposed into a between-industry component that depends only on
product demand shifts (changes in the 2jt’s) and a within-industry component that depends only on
the pace of skill-biased technological change (changes in the "jt’s).   These between- and within-
industry demand shift components can also be directly measured with data on industry shares of the
aggregate wage bill and on the share of the college wage-bill share in each industry.  The Cobb-
Douglas production function assumption implies that "jt’s are directly measured by the share of the
total wage bill accounted for by college equivalents in each industry:
(29) "jt = (wctNcjt)/Yjt83
where Yjt =  wctNcjt + whtNhjt = PjtQjt, with the last equality arising from constant returns to scale in
a model with only two labor inputs.  The assumption of , = 1 in equation (26) means that the relative
product demand shift for industry j (2jt/[Gj2jt) can be directly measured by its share of aggregate
revenues or by Yjt (its share of the aggregate wage bill) under the normalization of GjYjt = 1.
Differentiating the expression for Dt in equation (28) yields an expression for the
(instantaneous) rate of change in log relative demand for college equivalents that can be written as
 
where
and
and Yct = Gj"jtYjt = wctNct/(wctNct + whtNht), the aggregate college wage-bill share.  The numerator
of equation (31) is simply the within-industry growth component of the growth of the aggregate
college-wage bill share, and the numerator of equation (32) is simply the between-industry
component.  84
Thus a standard shift-share decomposition of the growth of the wage-bill (labor-cost) share
of more-skilled workers [Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998),
and Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998)] can be used to directly measure the effects of skill-biased
technological change (within-industry demand growth) and product market shifts (between-industry
demand growth) on overall relative demand growth.  Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) have
implemented this approach on data for three-digit industries for the 1960 to 1996 period.  They find
rate of within-industry relative demand growth for college graduates appears to have increased from
the 1960s to the 1970s and remained at a higher level in the 1980s and 1990s.  This restrictive Cobb-
Douglas framework suggests a larger impact of skill-biased technological change on the growth in
the relative demand for college workers from 1970 to 1996 than in the 1960s.  These results
highlight the importance of more directly examining evidence on the role of skill-biased
technological change in the recent widening of the wage structures of many OECD nations.
5.5 Skill-Biased Technological Change
The deteriorating labor market outcomes of less-educated workers in most OECD economies
over the past two decades despite their increasing relative scarcity strongly implies a strong decline
in the relative demand for less-skilled workers.  Skill-biased (or unskilled labor saving)
technological change and increased exposure to international competition from less developed
countries (Stolper-Samuelson effects) have been offered as the leading candidate explanations for
this demand shift.   Much  indirect  evidence suggests a  dominant  role  for  skill-biased
technological change (associated with changes in production techniques, organizational changes,
and reductions in the relative prices of computer services and new capital equipment) in the51The degree to which technological changes are pervasive across countries or localized within a single
country is an important issue in assessing the likely impact on relative wages in increasingly open economies.  It is
the sector bias rather than the factor bias of localized technological change that determines its impact on relative
wages in a small open economy operating under incomplete specialization in a standard Hecksher-Ohlin [Leamer
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declining relative demand for the less skilled.  First, as discussed in section 5.4, the magnitude of
employment (or wage bill) shifts to skill-intensive industries as measured by between-industry
demand shift indices is too small to be consistent with explanations giving a leading role to  product
demand shifts, such as induced by greater trade with developing countries, or Hicks-neutral, sector-
biased technological change.  Estimates of between-industry demand shifts also show little evidence
of acceleration in recent decades.  Second, despite increases in the relative wages of more-skilled
workers, the composition of U.S. employment continues to shift rapidly towards more-educated
workers and higher-skill occupation within detailed industries and within establishments [Autor,
Katz, and Krueger (1998), Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994); Dunne, Haltiwanger, and Troske
(1996)].   A rise in the relative cost to firms of skilled labor should have led to within-industry and
within-establishment shifts in employment towards unskilled labor in the absence of skill-biased
technological change.  Third, within-industry skill upgrading despite rising or stable skill premia is
apparent in found in almost all industries in many other developed economies in the 1980s.
Furthermore the cross-industry pattern of the rate of skill upgrading in manufacturing industries
appears to be quite similar among advanced nations [Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998)].   These
findings are consistent with an important role for pervasive skill-biased technological change
throughout developed countries and concentrated in similar industries in each country as a major
source of changes in relative skill demands.  The potential impact of skill-biased technological
change on the wage structure is likely to be greater the more pervasive it is across countries
[Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998), Johnson and Stafford (1998b), Krugman (1995)].
51(1996)].  Haskell and Slaughter (1998) provide an intriguing initial attempt to empirically examine whether
differences across countries in the pattern of the sector-bias of (localized) technological change can help explain
differences in changes in the relative wages of skilled workers in the 1980s.  But  the factor bias of technological
change is often the crucial determinant of the relative wage impact in a closed economy setting.  For example, the
factor bias alone matters for how technological changes affect relative wages in a closed economy model  with
Cobb-Douglas sectoral production functions and Cobb-Douglas consumer preferences as indicated by equation (28). 
The factor bias re-emerges as an important factor in an open economy setting when technological change is
pervasive across countries (since the integrated international economy as a whole can be viewed as a closed
economy) and for localized technological change for a large open economy (so that the world prices of tradeables are
affected by localized technological change). 
52Such a conjecture partially motivated Griliches (1969, 1970) early seminal work on capital-skill
complementarity.
53Their  measure of the capital-skill complementarity effect on relative wages evolves similarly to a linear
time trend.  Thus the aggregate time series model of Krusell et al. (1997) attributes variations in changes in the skill
premium around trend (such a sharp decline in the skill premium in the 1970s and sharp rise in the 1980s) to
variations in the rate of growth of the relative skill supplies and to unobserved demand shocks (the residual). 
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More direct evidence also suggests that (broadly interpreted) skill-biased technological
change is an important source of shifts in relative labor demand. Much econometric and case study
evidence indicates that the relative utilization of more-skilled workers is positively correlated with
capital intensity and the implementation of new technologies both across industries and across plants
within detailed industries [e.g., Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987); Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997);
Griliches (1969); Levy and Murnane (1996); Mark (1987)].  These patterns indicate that physical
capital and new technologies appear to be relative complements with more-skilled workers.   Thus
secular increases in the capital/labor ratio could be a source of secular growth in the relative demand
for skilled labor.
52  Krusell et al. (1997) present suggestive evidence that the rapid increase in the
(quality-adjusted) stock of capital equipment since the early 1960s combined with strong
complementarity between capital equipment and skilled labor can “account” for the trend growth
in the relative demand for skills.
53
There also appear to be strong correlations between industry-level indicators of technological
change (computer investments, the growth of employee computer use, research and development
(R&D) expenditures, utilization of scientists and engineers, changes in capital intensity measures)54But the change in export intensity does seem to have a robust positive relationship to within-industry skill
upgrading even conditional on measures of computer investments [Bernard and Jensen (1997); Autor, Katz, and
Krueger (1998)].
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and the within-industry growth in the relative employment and labor cost share of more-skilled
workers [Allen (1997); Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998); Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994);
Berndt, Morrison, and Rosenblum (1994); Machin and Van Reenen (1997), Wolff (1996)]. 
Technology indicators, particularly computer investment or employee computer usage, also appear
to be more powerful explanatory variables for differences among industries in the pace of skill
upgrading than are indicators of outsourcing activity, import pressures, or changes in export activity
[Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998)].
54 The causal interpretation of contemporaneous correlations of
technology indicators such as R&D intensity and computer use with skill upgrading since R&D
activities directly used highly-educated workers and since other sources of changes in the use of
skilled workers could drive variation across industries in purchases of computers.  But Autor, Katz,
and Krueger (1998), Machin and Van Reenen  (1997), and Wolff (1996) find that lagged computer
investments and R&D expenditures predict subsequent increases in the pace of skill upgrading.  This
pattern is consistent with a recent survey of U.S. human resource managers indicating that large
investments in information technology lead to changes in organizational practices that decentralize
decision-making, increase worker autonomy, and increase the need for highly-educated workers
[Bresnahan, Brynholfsson, and Hitt (1998)].
Plant-level studies of U.S. manufacturing by Bernard and Jensen (1997) and Doms, Dunne,
and Troske (1997) similarly find strong positive relationships between within-plant skill upgrading
and both R&D intensity and computer investments.  But Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997) find little
relationship between a plant -level indicator of the number of new factory automation technologies55The existence of a positive computer wage differential is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
the diffusion of computers to have induced a shift in the relative demand for more-skilled workers and to have
affected the wage structure.  If computer technologies are more complementary with highly-skilled than less-skilled
workers, a decline in computing costs and spread of computers could generate an increase in the relative demand for
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being used and within-plant skill upgrading.  In contrast, case studies by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics indicate large production labor saving production innovations were adopted in the 1970s
and 1980s in the electrical machinery, machinery, and printing and publishing sectors,  three
manufacturing industries that are among the leaders in the rate of skill upgrading in most developed
countries [Berman, Bound, and  Machin (1998); Mark (1987)].
The diffusion of computers and related technologies has attracted much attention as a
possibly important  measurable source of recent changes in the relative demand for skills.  The share
of U.S. workers using computers on the job, an extremely crude measure of the diffusion of
computer-based technologies,  increased from 25 percent in 1984 to 47 percent in 1993 [Autor, Katz,
and Krueger (1998)] The rapid spread of computers appears to have occurred at a similar pace in
other OECD countries.  For example, Card, Kramarz, and Lemiuex (1996) report similar levels of
employee computer usage in Canada, France, and the United States circa 1990.  Krueger [1993] and
Autor, Katz, and Krueger [1997] document a substantial log wage premium associated with
computer use (conditional on standard controls for observed worker characteristics) that increased
from 0.17 in 1984 to 0.20 in 1993.  The extent to which this computer wage premium represents a
measure of the true returns to computer skills (the treatment effect of computer use) or largely
reflects omitted characteristics of workers and their employers is a subject of much debate (see, for
example, Bell (1996) and DiNardo and Pischke (1997)).  But the resolution of this debate does not
directly address the issue of whether the spread of computer technologies has significantly changed
organizational practices and altered relative skill demands.
55   and relative wages of more-educated (and more-skilled) workers.  Labor market competition could require firms both
with and without computer technologies to pay equal wages to attain equally able employees.  In this case a cross-
section wage regression with sufficient controls for worker skills would yield no computer wage premium even
though computers may have greatly raised the relative wages of the more-skilled and widened the wage structure.
56Bresnahan (1997) provides a descriptive theory of and illuminating historical evidence on how computers
affect labor demand and organizational practices.  Sichel (1998) provides a thoughtful analysis of the overall impact
of the computer revolution on the U.S. economy.
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Computer technology may influence relative labor demand in several ways.
56  Computer
business systems often involve the routinization of many white-collar tasks.  Simple, repetitive tasks
have proved more amenable to computerization than more complex and idiosyncratic tasks
[Bresnahan (1997)].  Microprocessor-based technologies have similarly facilitated the automation
of many production processes in recent years.  Thus direct substitution of computers for human
judgement and labor is likely to have been more important in clerical and production jobs than in
managerial and professional jobs.  Computer-based technologies may also increase the returns to
creative use of greater available information to more closely tailor products and services to
customers’ specific needs and to develop new products.  Bresnahan (1997) posits such an
organizational complementarity between computers and workers who possess both greater cognitive
skills and greater “people” or “soft” skills.   
The direct substitution and organizational complementarity channels both predict that an
increase in the relative demand for highly-educated workers should be associated with
computerization.  These predictions are consistent with the findings of Autor, Katz, and Krueger
(1998) that increased computer intensity is associated with increased employment shares of
managers,  professionals and other highly educated workers, and with decreased employment shares
of clericals, production workers, and less educated workers.  Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt
(1998) similarly find in firm-level data that greater use of information technology is associated with57See Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt (1997b), and Gottschalk and
Smeeding (1997) for further discussion of these issues.
58For example, Goldin and Katz (1998) show that capital-deepening, the diffusion of purchased
electricity, and the introduction of continuous-process and batch methods of production greatly increased the
relative demand for nonproduction workers and more-educated production workers in manufacturing from
1909 to 1929
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the employment of more-educated workers, greater investments in training, broader job
responsibilities for line workers, and more decentralized decision-making.
A summary interpretation of the evidence on the impact of skill-biased technological change
on recent wage structure changes is illuminated by distinguishing between two distinctive
hypotheses that are sometimes confused.
57  The first is that skill-biased technological change
(broadly conceived to also include capital deepening and skill-biased organizational innovations)
is an important (and probably the most important) driving force behind long-run secular increases
in the relative labor demand more-educated and more-skilled workers.  The widespread direct
evidence of capital-skill and technology-skill complementarity and indirect evidence of strong
within-industry and within-plant increases in the relative demand for skill are strongly consistent
with this first hypothesis.  In fact, the introduction of new production technologies and increases in
physical capital intensity appear to have been typically associated with increased demand for more-
skilled workers throughout the twentieth century.
58
The second hypothesis is that the impact of technological change on the relative demand for
more-skilled workers accelerated recently (possibly in the 1980s), and this acceleration can account
for the particularly large increases in wage inequality and educational wage differentials in the
1980s.
The available evidence is less definitive with respect to this hypothesis.  A simply supply-and-
demand analysis for the United States (such as in Table 14) indicates a particularly rapid rate of59Recent models of how periods of rapid technological change affect the labor market include Caselli
(1997), Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), and Helpman and Rangel (1998).
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relative demand growth in the 1980s under our preferred values for the aggregate elasticity of
substitution between college and non-college labor.  In contrast, implied relative demand growth is
much slower in the 1990s a period a continuing rapid spread of computers.  But Autor, Katz, and
Krueger (1998) find that within-industry demand growth accelerated from the 1960s to the 1970s
and then stayed at this higher level through the mid-1990s.  This provides some indirect evidence
that the impact of skill-biased technological change on relative skill demands accelerated starting
in the 1970s.  Autor, Katz, and Krueger also provide some more direct evidence that the increase
in rate of within-industry skill upgrading from the 1960s to the post-1970 period is concentrated in
the most computer intensive sectors of the economy.  The exceptionally rapid increase in the relative
supply of college graduates in the 1970s from the labor market entry of the baby-boom cohorts
delayed the impact of this demand shift on wages until the 1980s.  A deceleration of relative skill
supply growth from the 1970s to the 1980s and 1990s appears to be a crucial part of differences in
U.S. wage structure behavior in the 1970s and the period since the 1979.    
Several conceptual issues concerning the nature of skill-biased technological change merit
further consideration.  One possibility is that skilled workers are more flexible and facilitate the
adoption of new technologies so that all technological change increases the relative demand for
more-skilled labor over some transitional period [Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987); Greenwood and
Yorukoglu (1997); and Welch (1970)].   As technologies diffuse and become routinized the
comparative advantage of the highly skilled declines.  In this case the level of demand for skilled
labor depends on the rate of innovation.  Periods of large increases in the skill premium correspond
to technological revolutions.
59  But an ever increasing rate of innovation seems to be necessary to92
generate persistent secular growth in the relative demand for more-educated workers.  Furthermore
the apparent slowdown in growth of the relative demand for skill in the 1990s could reflect the
maturing of the computer revolution.  An alternative (but potentially complementary) hypothesis
is that distinctive technological innovations may have different factor biases.  Some of the main
technological changes of the twentieth century associated with electrification and computerization
may have been skill-biased, but other innovations need not be.  Mechanization in the nineteenth
century associated with the movement from artisanal production (intensive in skilled craft workers)
to factory production (intensive in unskilled labor) appears to have been largely deskilling even
though more flexible workers were likely to have been necessary to assist in the introduction of
factory methods [Goldin and Katz (1998)].    Under this scenario the inherent skill-biased nature of
twentieth century innovations rather than an accelerating rate of innovation is the source of secular
within-industry growth in the relative demand for skill.  
An important further issue concerns the extent to which the rate of technological change and
its direction (i.e., the extent to which technological change is skill-biased) are exogenous or are
affected by changes in relative skill supplies.   Acemoglu (1998), following a substantial earlier
literature on induced innovation, has developed an interesting model in which increases in the
proportion of skilled workers affect R&D efforts and can direct technological change in a skill-
biased.  Acemoglu finds it is possible for the “induced” increase in the relative demand for skills to
even overshoot the increase in the relative supply of skills.
  60A comprehensive treatment of theoretical and empirical issues related to assessing the impacts of
international trade on the labor market is contained in the chapter by Johnson and Stafford (1998b).  The chapter by
Borjas (1998) contains a detailed analysis of immigration and the wage structure.  Thus we present only a brief
treatment of issues concerning the role of globalization factors in recent changes in the wage structure.
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5.6 Globalization and Deindustrialization
60
A popular culprit for rising labor market inequalities in developed countries is the increased
globalization of economic activity arising from reductions in barriers to trade and reduced costs to
international economic transactions.  Increased trade with developing countries is commonly viewed
as a driving force behind “deindustrialization” (a sharp decline in the share of employment in
production jobs in manufacturing) and the woes of  less-skilled workers in advanced economies
[e.g., Wood (1994, 1995, 1998)].  U.S. manufacturing imports from less-developed countries (LDCs)
increased from 0.8% of GNP in 1970 to 2.3% in 1980 to 2.8% in 1990 to 4.1% in 1996 [Borjas,
Freeman, and Katz (1997)].  Increased international capital mobility, reduced costs of international
technology transfer, and greater foreign outsourcing opportunities also may increase the effective
elasticity of demand facing workers in bargaining, erode their bargaining power, and reduce the
extent to which internal labor markets insulate them from product market and labor market shocks
[e.g., Bertrand (1998); Borjas and Ramey (1995); Rodrik (1997)].
A common (but controversial) method for estimating the effects of trade on labor markets
is factor content analysis [Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1992, 1997); Lawrence (1996); Sachs and
Shatz (1994); Wood (1994, 1995)].  The basic approach is to determine how much of different types
of labor (e.g., skilled and unskilled labor) are used to produce a country’s exports, and how much
would have been used in produce its imports (or the domestic goods that would have been produced
in the absence of imports).  The difference between the supplies of labor used in exports and imports
provides an estimate of the implicit change in the relative supply of unskilled labor from trade, or,94
equivalently, the impact of trade on the relative demand for the unskilled.  An estimate of the
aggregate elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor can then be used to simulate
the impact of the implicit change in relative skill supplies from trade.  Increased trade will tend to
have an adverse effect on less-skilled workers to the extent that import-competing industries
disproportionately employ less-skilled workers and export sectors are relatively more skill-intensive.
This pattern is strongly present for U.S. trade with LDCs, but the characteristics of workers in
industries with high imports and exports with other developed countries are fairly similar [Borjas,
Freeman, and Katz (1997); Sachs and Shatz (1994)].
The factor content of observed changes in net exports can provide an accurate input to
assessing how changes in trade affect relative wages in limited circumstances [Johnson and Stafford
(1998b)].  If one begins in autarky, then allows for trade, and trade is a modest proportion of the
national economy, the change in national endowments due to the factor content of trade measures
the pressure of trade for changes in relative wages [Deardorff and Staiger (1988); Krugman (1995)].
More generally, if the changes in net exports being examined are caused by external factors (e.g.,
reductions in trade barriers or reductions in transportation costs, changes in factor endowments
abroad), then factor content analysis may be sensible.  If changes in net exports result from domestic
sources (e.g., an increase in the relative supply of skilled labor leading to greater net exports of high-
skill goods and lower net exports of low-skill good), then factor content analysis can be quite
misleading [Leamer (1996)]. 
A further practical issue in factor content analysis is the how to estimate the hypothetical
factor content of the domestic production that would arise to replace imports from LDCs.  The
standard approach is to assume LDC imports would be replaced by domestic production in the95
closest import-competing industry using the contemporaneous average factor proportion in the
domestic import-competing industry [e.g., Sachs and Shatz (1994)].  But Wood (1994, 1995) has
argued persuasively that within each sector there is a wide distribution of factor proportions and
labor productivity,  and that LDC imports are likely to be most directly competing with the segment
of an industry using the most unskilled-labor intensive production techniques.  The issue is
somewhat more complicated since some LDC imports may not closely compete with any domestic
industry so that their absence might expand domestic demand for goods or services with quite
different (and possibly even higher) skill intensities than in the assumed “import-competing” sector.
Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) examine the factor content of the growth of U.S. trade
with LDCs from 1980 to 1995.  They examine the robustness of the conclusions to a wide range of
assumptions concerning the factor ratios that would have been used in U.S. industries to replace
LDC imports.  They find that the growth of trade with LDC’s from 1980 to 1995 to a 1.4 log point
increase in the implicit relative supply of high school equivalents relative to college equivalents
assuming U.S. manufactures would use the same factor ratios that prevailed in their industries in
1980 (prior to the change in LDC trade being assessed) in the absence of LDC imports.   Under our
preferred estimate of F=1.4, this implies that growth of trade with LDCs can account for only 1 log
point out of a 19 log point increase in the college wage premium from 1980 to 1995.  Thus demand
shifts from skill-biased technological change and domestic sources of changes in relative skill
supplies appear to be much more significant factors in the recent expansion of the U.S. college wage
premium than trade’s impact as measured by factor contents.  The impact is relatively larger if one
focuses on the impact of trade on the high school dropouts.  But Borjas, Freeman, and Katz also find
that increased unskilled immigration had a much larger impact on changing the implicit relative61The rate of skill-biased technological change may also be affected by globalization factors both through
lower costs of technology transfer (lower cooperation costs) and through threats of foreign competition inducing
“defensive innovation” [Wood (1994, 1998)].
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supply of the least skilled U.S. workers than did LDC trade from 1980 to 1995.
The factor content approach may understate the effects of globalization pressures on relative
wages when the threat of trade, outsourcing, or plant relocation can lead to wage changes even in
the absence of new trade flows [Rodrik (1997)].
61   Borjas and Ramey (1995) explore the
contribution of the erosion of industry wage differentials in trade competing durable goods
manufacturing industries to increased U.S. educational wage differentials and find it to be quite
modest. 
 Product-price studies attempt to more directly assess the implication of the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem that impacts of trade on relative wages operates through changes in the relative
product price of more- and less-skill intensive.  Product-price studies suffer from similar practical
limitations to factor-content studies both arising from data quality issues in price data (the difficulty
of separating true price from quality changes) and difficulties in trying to isolate product-price
changes driven by exogenous trade-related forces rather than other sources.  Slaughter (1998)
provides a nice a review of the emerging literature in this area and concludes that these limitations
combined with a wide range of somewhat conflicting results make it difficult to draw strong
conclusions from the price studies concerning the impact of international trade on wage inequality.
 Attempts to isolate “exogenous” international components of changes in product prices and trade
flows (possibly by examining the consequences of changes in trade policy and explicit trade
barriers) could be a more fruitful research strategy than standard approaches to factor content
analysis and product price studies.62The 1980s were also a period of a substantial decline in unions and erosion of the minimum wage, and the
two World Wars are periods of growing union power and government intervention in the economy.
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“Deindustrialization” (a substantial decline in manufacturing employment) is also often
identified as a leading cause of poor labor market performance of less-skilled workers in advanced
countries.  And international trade is often viewed as the major driving force behind
deindustrialization [e.g., Wood (1994, 1995, 1998)].  Between-industry demand shift indices
(Section 5.4) do indicate that shifts out of manufacturing to more-skill intensive sectors have played
some role in the decline in the relative demand for less-skilled workers.  But the overall rate of
between-industry demand shifts does not appear to be any larger in the period of sharp increases in
wage inequality in the 1980s than in other recent decades.  Nevertheless, it is striking that much of
the recent increase in U.S. wage inequality and educational wage differentials is concentrated in the
period from 1979 to 1985 centered on a deep recession and containing a large appreciation of the
U.S. dollar and large decline in manufacturing employment.  And the periods of extremely tight
labor markets and strong demand for production workers in manufacturing during the two World
Wars are the two periods of large compressions in the U.S. wage structure during the twentieth
century.
62  Furthermore studies using geographic variation across U.S. states and metropolitan areas
consistently find that larger declines in manufacturing employment are strongly positively associated
(at least in the short-run) with larger increases in overall wage inequality [Juhn (1994)], residual
wage inequality [Bernard and Jenson (1998)], and educational wage differentials [Borjas and Ramey
(1995); Bound and Holzer (1997)].  
5.7 Summary
Supply and demand models provide a useful organizing framework for understanding63We focus on applications of supply and demand models to explaining changes in educational wage
differentials in this chapter.  Similar models have proved useful for examining changes in relative wages by age or
experience [e.g., Freeman (1979); Katz and Murphy (1992); Welch (1992)].  Supply and demand models are more-
difficult to apply to changes in within-group (residual) inequality that are a key component of rising U.S. wage
inequality over the last two decades.   See Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) for an interesting attempt to measure
between-industry and between-occupation shifts in relative demand for observed and unobserved skills based on the
assumption that skills are measured by one’s position (percentile) in the wage distribution.
98
important aspects of between-group wage structure changes.
63  Supply and demand factors (the
determinants of competitive wages in the SDI framework of section 4) are important determinants
of wage structure changes.  Substantial secular increases in the relative demand for more-educated
and more-skilled workers appear necessary to explain observed patterns of the evolution of the wage
structure in developed countries over most of the last century.  Shifts in the industrial and
occupational distribution of employment to more skill-intensive industries and occupations can
account for a significant minority of this growth in the relative demand for skills.  But within-
industry growth  in relative labor demand favoring the more educated (within-industry skill
upgrading) appears to be the major driving force in the rise in the relative demand for the more
skilled.  This pattern suggests a key role for skill-biased technological change in explaining relative
demand shifts.  Strong positive cross-industry correlations of indicators of technological change
(especially indicators of the usage of computer-based technologies) and the rate of skill upgrading
provides more direct evidence on the importance of skill-biased technological change.  Technology
factors appear to be somewhat more important than international trade changes as a source of
relative demand shifts favoring the more-skilled.  
Variations in the rate of growth in the relative supply of more-educated workers (college
workers) appear to a be an important determinant of variations in the rate of change of educational
and occupational wage differentials.  Changes in cohort size, incentives for educational investments,64See Topel (1997) for a more thorough analysis of the impacts of alternative sources of changes in relative
factor proportions.  See Macunovich (1998) for an interesting and more expansive analysis of how changes in
relative cohort size affect the wage distribution both through standard effects of changes in factor proportions and
through changes in the level and composition of aggregate labor demand through differences over the life-cycle in
consumption behavior.
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changes in female labor force participation, and international immigration appear to be important
sources of variations in relative skill supplies.
64  Detrended skill supply growth helps predict
detrended changes in the college wage premium in the United States and other advanced nations.
A deceleration in the rate of growth of the relative supply of college workers appears to be an
important determinant of the sharp increase in U.S. educational wage differentials in the 1980s, and
especially rapid growth in relative skill supply a key determinant of the narrowing of the college
wage premium in the 1970s.  Countries with decelerations in relative supply growth in the 1980s
are those with the largest increase in educational wage differentials.  
The data are less clear on whether the recent widening of the wage structure is largely driven
by an acceleration in relative demand shifts favoring the more-skilled.  For the United States, the
pace of within-industry skill upgrading does appear to have increased since 1970, and the 1980s do
appear to be a period of particularly rapid relative demand growth.  But institutional factors (the
erosion of unions and the minimum wage and loss of industry rates) operating in the 1980s
combined with supply growth deceleration can potentially explain the observed patterns even when
combined with smooth trend growth in the relative demand for more-educated workers.  We next
turn to an examination of how changes in labor market institutions affect the wage structure.
6. Labor Market Rents and Labor Market Institutions
 Large and persistent wage differentials are present across industries and establishments even100
after conditioning on observed measures of worker characteristics, working conditions, and non-
wage employee benefits and even after controlling for (time-invariant) worker unobserved ability
through individual fixed effects [e.g., Gibbons and Katz (1992); Groshen (1991); Krueger and
Summers (1988)].  Positive inter-industry wage differentials are associated with lower employee quit
rates and longer queues of job applicants [Holzer, Katz, and Krueger (1991); Katz and Summers
(1989)].  Thus  industry and establishment wage differences appear to partially reflect variation in
relative rents such as predicted by models emphasizing efficiency wage considerations and worker
bargaining power [e.g, Katz (1986); Lindbeck and Snower (1988)].  Differences across countries
in wage setting institutions (union and government roles in wage setting) appear to be strongly
related to differences in levels of wage inequality among advanced nations especially in the lower
half of the wage distribution and to differences in the magnitude of educational wage differentials
[Blau and Kahn (1996, 1998); Freeman (1993, 1996)].
The apparent importance of labor rents and institutional interventions in cross-section wage
distributions suggest that these factors may also matter for changes in the distribution of wages.  The
same labor market shocks (e.g., from skill-biased technological change, globalization factors, or
changes in skill supplies) may have different impacts on the wage structure depending on how
unions and government regulations affect wage setting.  Changes in labor market institutions and
the incidence of labor market rents may directly lead to wage structure changes.
In this section, we first explore the role of institutional factors on recent U.S. wage structure
changes.  We examine the existing research on impacts of changes in industry rents, changes in the
unionization, and changes in the “bite” of the Federal minimum wage.  We then briefly discuss the
overall roles of supply, demand, and institutional factors in differences in wage structure changes101
among advanced nations.  An interesting and rather unexplored topic for further research is the
impact of changes in ideology and norms of fairness on wage setting [e.g., Rotemberg (1996)].  The
large wage structure changes in most countries during the two World Wars clearly indicate the
possible importance of large shocks that change wage setting norms.
6.1 Industry Rents
The large variation across industries in wages for workers with the same observed
characteristics suggests that differences across groups in shifts in the industrial distribution of
employment may help explain changes in the wage structure by affecting the average industry wage
premium earned by different groups.  The share of less-educated U.S. employees working in high-
wage durable goods manufacturing fell dramatically in the 1980s, while the share of college
graduates working durable goods changed very little and the share in high-wage service industries
(e.g., financial and professional services) increased substantially.  Furthermore the share of female
college graduates working in the low-wage education and welfare service industries declined
substantially in the 1980s. These patterns are most pronounced for young workers (those with up
to 9 years of potential experience) [Katz and Revenga (1989)].  Changes in industry wage effects
may also have differential effects across demographic and skill groups given their quite distinctive
industrial employment distributions (e.g., a decline in the wage premium to construction workers
has a larger effect on less-educated workers who are disproportionately employed in construction).
Much research documents that changes in the U.S. wage structure by education, experience,
and gender over the past several decades largely reflect within-industry changes rather than changes
in the incidence of industry rents [e.g., Bound and Johnson (1992); Murphy and Welch (1993b)].65Changes in U.S. wage inequality and educational wage differentials in the 1980s are much smaller in the
public sector than in the private sector [Katz and Krueger (1991)].  These public/private differences are suggestive of
the importance of how differences in wage setting institutions and political pressure on wage setting can lead to quite
different relative wage responses to similar labor market shocks.  The rising level of unionization in the public sector
since the early 1970s  as compared to substantial deunionization in the private sector may also have played a role in
the smaller growth in inequality among public sector workers [Card (1998)].
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But changes in average industry rents do appear to have significantly contributed to widening
educational wage differentials in the 1980s.  For example, Murphy and Welch (1993b) find, using
a 49 (approximate two-digit industry) decomposition, that the U.S. college/high school wage
differential increased 16.2 percent overall and 12.0 percent within industries.  Large changes in the
college wage premium occur within essentially every industry, although the changes are much more
moderate in industries with large shares of public employees.
65  Thus changes in relative labor rents
from differential shifts in the industrial composition of employment by education group could
explain up to one-fourth of the rise in the college wage premium in the 1980s.  The implied estimate
should be reduced proportionately to the extent industry wage differentials represent differences in
unobserved ability as opposed to “true” wage differentials from labor market rents.  Bound and
Johnson (1992) find similar impacts of changes in the magnitude of industry rents accruing to
college and high school workers in the 1980s.  The impact of a declining employment share of the
less-educated in high-wage industries (durable goods manufacturing) appears to be especially
important for young workers in the 1980s.  Murphy and Welch (1993b) estimate that the
college/high school wage differential increased by 26.3 percent for workers with 1 to 10 years of
experience and by 20 percent within industries.  But differences in the behavior of educational wage
differentials for young workers in the 1970s and the 1980s are strikingly driven by within industry
changes ( a changes of 33.8 percent overall versus 29.2 percent within industries).  The growth of
within-group (residual) wage inequality in the 1970s and 1980s is also dominated by the within-66But Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) and Dunne, Haltiwanger, and Troske (1997) find with plant-level data
that growing between-plant wage differentials are an important component of increased wage dispersion for
manufacturing employees in the 1980s and early 1990s.
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industry component [Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993)].
66  
The recent widening of the U.S. wage structure also provides a potential laboratory for
assessing alternative interpretations of measured inter-industry wage differentials.  If industry wage
differentials largely reflect differences across industries in average unobserved ability [e.g., Abowd,
Kramarz, and Margolis (1998); Murphy and Topel (1990)], then a sharp rise in the returns to skill
should lead to a widening of measured inter-industry wage differentials in the 1980s and 1990s.
Widening industry wage differentials in the 1970s [Bell and Freeman (1991)] are consistent with
this hypothesis given the rise in within group inequality in the 1970s suggests a rise in the price of
unobserved skills.  Krueger (1998) presents a preliminary exploration of this issue for the more
recent period (using data from the CPS ORG file) and finds little evidence that the dispersion of
inter-industry wage differentials (the standard deviation of estimated industry wage differentials for
men conditional on education and experience) increased from 1979 to 1993.  Krueger finds the
(adjusted) standard deviation of industry wage differentials (at the approximately two-digit level)
increased sharply from 0.147 in 1979 to 0.173 in 1983 and then declined rather steadily back to
0.149 in 1993.  
6.2 Unions
Unions play an important role in wage determination in all advanced nations both directly
through collective bargaining and union threat (or spillover) effects on wages and indirectly by
affecting government policies (e.g., minimum wages and other product and labor market67The decline in U.S. union density began in the mid-1950s, but the 1980s are the period of most precipitous
decline.
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regulations).  Lewis (1986) concludes from a thorough review of the enormous literature on U.S.
union relative wage effects that the average treatment effect of union coverage on individual
earnings (holding the locus of unionization fixed) was approximately 15 percent (15 log points) in
the 1970s.  More recent studies using longitudinal data to control for selectivity on unobserved
ability into the union sector reach a similar conclusion and find a much larger union wage effect for
low-skill and less-educated workers than for high-skill and more-educated workers [e.g., Card
(1996)].  Thus traditionally higher unionization rates among less-educated and blue-collar males are
likely to have tended to serve to reduce educational and occupational wage differentials.   Unions
also tend to reduce wage inequality within the union sector by compressing wage differentials and
standardizing wages between jobs and between establishments.  Freeman and Medoff (1984)
conclude for the United States that the inequality reducing effects of unions (standardizing wages
among jobs and narrowing the white collar/blue collar wage differential) have tended to be larger
than the inequality increase effect of unions by creating a union/nonunion wage differentials among
workers who otherwise would receive similar wages.
Thus the sharp U.S. decline in unionization over the past two decades concentrated among
less-educated males could be an important source of expanding educational wage differentials and
overall wage inequality for males.
67  Card (1997) estimates that the U.S. union membership for
males declined from 30.8 percent in 1973-74 to 18.7 percent in 1993.  The overall decline masks
substantial differences by education.  Among U.S. males, the unionization rate fell from 1973-74
to 1993 by 20.8 percentage points for those with less than 12 years of schooling, 14.8 percentage
points for those with exactly 12 years of schooling, and actually increased slightly for college105
graduates.
A simplified version of the group wage determination model of equation (12) can be used
to make a first-cut assessment of how changes in unionization affect between-group wage
differentials.  We assume the mean log wage for group k (Yk) is the sum of the competitive wage
for group k (Ykc) and the product of the fraction of group-k workers that are unionized (Uk) and the
union wage premium for group k (8k): Yk = Ykc + 8kUk.  This approach ignores any impact of unions
on non-union wages either through union threat effects or through spillover effects in which workers
displaced by higher union wages increase the supply of workers to the nonunion sector.  The change
in wages for group k is then given by a simplified version of equation (13):
(33) dYk = dYkc + d8kUk + 8kdUk.
Differences among groups in their changes in unionization rates and in changes in their union wage
premia can affect their relative wages.  Bound and Johnson (1992) implement this approach
assuming a 15 percent union wage effect for all groups (8k = 0.15 for all k).  Bound and Johnson find
the unionizaton rate for male high school graduates fell by 11.5 percentage points from 1979 to 1998
as compared a decline of 2.8 percentage points for male college graduates.  Under these assumptions
the larger union decline for high school than college graduates accounted for a 1.3 log point
expansion in the college wage premium for males from 1979 to 1988, or 8 percent of overall
increase of 16.3 log points.  Freeman (1993) does a full shift-share decomposition using equation
(33) and allowing for differences in the union wage premium among education (and occupation)
groups and  over time.  Freeman finds that de-unionization can explain a 1.5 log point increase in106
the male college wage premium from 1978 to 1988, but had a much larger impact (4 log points) on
the expansion of the college wage premium for younger males (those aged 25 to 34).  
    DiNardo, Fortin and Lemiuex (1996) and Card (1997) examine the effects of deunionization
on overall wage inequality for U.S. men and women, and Freeman (1993) examine the effects on
male wage variance.  DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux use a semiparametric procedure to simulate the
effects of changes in union density on the full distribution of wages of both men and women.  The
driving force in their results is the much more compressed wage distribution for nonunion males
than for union males. Their approach essentially attributes the differences in wage distributions by
union status to the effects of unions on the wages of union workers.  The impacts of nonrandom
selection of workers into the union sector and of the general equilibrium effects of unionization are
not explicitly considered.  The key identifying assumption is that wage densities conditional on
union status and observable covariates do not depend on the unionization rate.  This may be a
problematic assumption to the extent changes in the unionization rate affect the degree of
nonrandom selection by unobservables into the union sector and have general equilibrium effects
on the union and nonunion wage distributions through changes in union power, union threat effects,
and union spillover effects.  
DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux simulate the effect of the decline in unionization from 1979
to 1988 on the wage distribution in 1988 by reweighting the actual 1988 union and nonunion wage
densities using the 1979 unionization rate rather than the 1988 unionization rate (i.e., giving larger
weight to the more compressed wage distribution for nonunion workers).  They find that the decline
in unionization from 1979 to 1988 can account for 10.7 percent  (0.021 log points) of the 0.195 log
point rise in the 90-10 log wage differential for males and has almost no effect on changes in wage107
inequality for females.  DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux’s results suggest the decline in unionization
contributed to a “declining middle” of the male wage distribution and can “explain” one-third of the
increase in the 90-50 wage differential and actually partially offset other forces towards a widening
of the 50-10 differential.
Freeman (1993) attempts to estimate the effects of deunionization on the change in the
variance of log earnings of U.S. males from 1978 to 1988.  He decomposes the effects of
deunionization  into changes in  three components of the impact of unions on the variance of male
log earnings: (1) the dispersion reducing effect of union among blue-collar union workers; (2) the
dispersion increasing effect of unionism on the earnings of blue collar worker due to the union wage
differential; and (3) the dispersion-reducing effect of unionism due to the union-induced reduction
in the white collar/blue collar wage differential.  Standard cross-section based estimates of each of
these union effects are used in these calculations.  Freeman concludes that the decline in union
density can explain approximately 20 percent of the rise in male earnings inequality from 1978 to
1988 through these three mechanisms.  Card (1997) generalizes Freeman’s approach to account for
non-random selection of workers into the union sector on estimates of union wage differentials and
union effects on wage dispersion within the union sector.  Card’s adjusted estimates suggests
somewhat more modest effects than those using standard cross-section estimates of union impacts.
Card concludes that declining unionization can explain about 12 percent of the rise in male wage
inequality (variance in log wages) from 1973-74 to 1993 and essentially none of the increase for
females.
In summary, the existing literature suggests both differential declines in industry rents by
skill groups and the concentration of deunionization on the less-educated contributed to the68Th e recent literature suggests rather modest effects of changes in the Federal minimum wage on the
employment of low-wage workers [Card and Krueger (1995)].
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enormous increase in educational wage differentials and overall male wage inequality in the 1980s.
Key outstanding issues in the assessment of the effects of deunionization on wage structure are the
importance of unmeasured general equilibrium effects of unions on the wage structure and the extent
to which union density changes are endogenous responses to other labor market forces.   A further
open question is whether one should adjust the observed changes in wage differentials used in
supply and demand analyses for the effects of changes in industry rents and unionization.  If these
changes don’t affect relative group employments (the economy moves off the labor demand curve),
then the apparent acceleration of relative demand growth for college workers in the 1980s (e.g., as
shown in Table 12 for F=1.4) might actually reflect the erosion of the relative labor rents of less
educated workers.
6.3 Minimum Wage
Direct government intervention in wage setting may also be a key factor in shaping the wage
structure. The Federal minimum wage potentially may have significant effects in reducing wage
inequality by raising wages in the lower end of the U.S. wage distribution as well as adverse effects
on the employment of low-wage workers.
68   The nominal Federal minimum wage was fixed
at $3.35 an hour from 1981 to 1990 so that the real Federal minimum wage declined throughout this
period.
The minimum wage relative to the median wage declined by almost 40 log points from 1979 to 1989
[Lee (1998)].  Visual inspection of U.S. wage distributions for men and women in 1979 and the late
1980s show substantial bunching around the (relatively high) minimum wage in 1979 (especially109
for women) and much less bunching around the relatively low minimum wage in the late 1980s.
These patterns are suggestive of a substantial possible role for the erosion of the relative (and real)
value of the Federal minimum wage on the widening of the lower half of the U.S. wage distribution
in the 1980s.
DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) simulate the effects of restoring the 1988 minimum
wage to its 1979 real value under the assumptions of no disemployment effects of such a 27 percent
increase in the minimum wage and no spillovers of the minimum wage onto the distribution of
wages above the minimum wage.  They find that the decline in the real value of the minimum wage
from 1979 to 1988 can account for most of the increase in the 50-10 log wage differential for both
men and women and 17 to 25 percent of growth in the standard deviation of log hourly wages for
men and 25 to 30 percent of the increase for women.  The effects of the decline in the minimum
wage on the college wage premium are somewhat more modest. 
The interpretation of these minimum wage impacts depends on whether it is reasonable to
assume a constant real minimum wage from 1979 to 1988 would imply a constant “bite” of the
minimum wage.  The erosion of the real and relative minimum in the 1980s could be a political
response to changes in market force that reduced the relative shadow competitive wage of less-
skilled workers and increased the adverse employment effects of minimum wage increases.  The
declining relative employment of workers with low-predicted wages in the 1980s [e.g., Juhn,
Murphy and Topel (1991); Murphy and Topel (1997)] despite a declining minimum wage suggests
other market forces were serving to reduce the labor market opportunities of low-wage workers.
The strong correlations of a declining relative minimum wage with declining relative earnings of
low-wage workers appear consistent with either direction of causation.110
Lee (1998) attempts to address this issue by looking at cross-state differences in the impact
of the Federal minimum wage given substantial differences in wage levels across U.S. states.  Lee’s
approach also allows for spillover effects of the minimum wage on wages up to the median of the
wage distribution.  He uses state panel data and finds strong effects of the minimum wage (relative
to the  median wage) on lower part of state wage distributions both using cross-section (between
state variation) and panel data models with state and year effects.  Cross-state differences in the
“effective minimum wage” and observed state wage distributions are used to estimate effect of
changes in the minimum wage on wage distribution.  The key identifying assumption is that the
“underlying” dispersion in a state’s wage distribution is orthogonal to the state’s effective minimum
wage.  Low-wage states must not have inherently lower wage dispersion in the bottom half of the
wage distribution than high-wage states for this approach to be valid (since the cross-state
uniformity of the Federal  minimum wage implies a higher effective minimum wage in low-wage
states).  Lee finds a strong relationship across states (especially in 1979) between the effective
minimum wage and compression of the lower half of wage distribution, but little systematic relation
with dispersion in the upper half suggesting no inherent differences in wage dispersion by state wage
levels. 
Lee’s (1998) estimates using cross-state variation in the effective minimum to estimate how
the effective minimum effects the lower half of state wage distributions implies essentially all of the
increase in the 50-10 wage differential from 1979 to 1988 is driven by the decline in the effective
Federal minimum wage.  Furthermore the rise in the minimum wage from 1989 to 1991 is associated
with a narrowing of wage dispersion in the lower half of the wage distribution.   Lee concludes that
the erosion of the minimum wage can account for much of the increase in residual wage inequality111
in the 1980s and a modest proportion of increases in educational wage differentials.  Teulings (1998)
finds even larger minimum wage impacts examining differences across four U.S. regions and
allowing for minimum wage spillovers to spread throughout the wage distribution. The large
magnitudes of spillover effects of the minimum wage in the studies of Lee (1998) and Teulings
(1998) studies are important issues for further scrutiny as well as the possible impacts of alternative
assumptions about employment effects of the minimum wage. 
6.4 The SDI Model and Cross-Country Differences in Wage Structure Changes
The pattern of demand shifts for more-skilled workers appears relatively similar in advanced
nations, but not all OECD nations have experienced sharp increases in wage dispersion and
educational wage differentials similar to the United States since the end of the 1970s.  Differences
in the growth of relative skill supplies appear to be an important factor in cross-country differences.
Decelerations in the growth in the relative supply of skills in the 1980s seem more pronounced in
the countries with the largest expansions in educational wage differentials and overall wage
inequality (the United States and the United Kingdom).   Differences in labor market institutions
among countries and changes in those institutions influenced the recent pattern of wage inequality
changes among OECD countries [Freeman and Katz (1994, 1995)].  Countries where unions,
employer federations, and government agencies play a larger role in wage determination had smaller
increases in inequality than in the United States.  The comparison of Canada and the United States
is instructive since the labor market shocks from technology and trade are likely to have been fairly
similar.  Yet differences in the pattern of relative skill supply growth (a deceleration in the United
States but not in Canada) and wage setting institutions (much greater deunionization in the United112
States) appear to greatly account for larger increases in educational wage differentials and overall
wage inequality in the United States ([Freeman and Needles (1993); DiNardo and Lemieux (1997)].
Countries with declining influences of wage setting institutions also tend to experience larger
increases in wage inequality.  For example, increased wage inequality appears to coincide with
declining unionization in Britain in the 1980s, with Sweden’s move from peak-level bargaining to
more company- and industry-based settlement in the mid-1980s, with the ending of the greater
government intervention in wage setting through the scala mobile in Italy in the early 1990s.
A key difficultly in the separation of the effect of supply and demand factors from those
of institutional factors is the usual interpretation of institutional change as an outside force that
affects labor market outcomes.  But institutions are not immune to market forces.  Shifts in
supply and demand that raise relative wage differentials will reduce the strength of centralized
collective bargaining and lower union influence on wage setting [e.g., Freeman and Gibbons
(1995)].  Institutions that go strongly against market forces face a difficult task.  The fact that
unionization fell in most countries in the 1980s, when market forces appear to have favored
greater inequality, may be no accident.  Italy's dropping of the scala mobile, Sweden's move
away from peak-level bargaining, and the 1980s' trend toward more plant- or firm-level
arrangements in France partially reflect responses to a changing economic environment, not just
random variations in modes of pay setting.  A better understanding of the endogenous
determinants of institutional changes is a crucial issue for future work on wage structure
changes.113
7. Conclusions
The existing research on changes in wage structures and earnings inequality suggest several
directions for future research.  In particular, researchers should consider the roles of changes in labor
market institutions (the incidence of labor market rents) as well as changes in competitive supply
and demand factors in assessing changes in the wage structure.  A key issue in such analyses that
use a full supply-demand-institutions model is how to model the effects of institutions on
employment rates and composition as well as on wages.  And the extent to which institutional
changes reflect exogenous political events as opposed to responses to market forces is also a major
factor to assess in any attempt to sort out the effects of institutions from supply and demand factors.
Analyses of wage structure changes also can benefit from taking somewhat of a longer-term
historical perspective then just examining the most recent decade of data.   For example, an analysis
focusing on U.S. wage structure changes in the 1980s alone would conclude little effect of supply
factors since groups with rising relative wages have rising relative supplies (the more-educated,
older workers, women) indicating demand shifts are the driving force.  An analysis of just the 1970s
might find that demographic factors (the baby boom and a rising supply of college graduates) can
explain rising experience differentials and narrowing educational wage differentials even with stable
demand. But a consideration of a longer horizon might (e.g., the 1960s to the 1990s) actually
indicates that relative supply shifts (e.g., the growth in the relative supply of college workers)
actually slowed down in the 1980s and were exceptionally fast in the 1970s and that strong secular
demand shifts favoring the more-educated a key element on any explanation.  The importance of
factors such as skill-biased technological change and globalization pressures in the 1980s and 1990s
also look different went viewed through a longer-term perspective.  Cross-country comparative work114
and differences across regions within a country may also provide useful variation in demand and
supply shocks and institutional factors.115
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